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Emotion modelling is receiving more and more attention from various fields, e.g. 
cognitive science, psychology, computer science and neuroscience. Most of these 
fields share the common research consensus that emotion can be beneficial to 
human’s mental activities. This thesis is also grounded on the same consensus and 
makes further validations based on the following two hypotheses: One is emotional 
agents in games should to behave more like human beings than emotionless agents; 
the other is that agents having full emotional architecture should obtain better playing 
performance than agents with only partial architecture. Based on theoretical support, 
the author further hypothesizes that peoples’ long term belief can be one of the 
sources to release complex emotions.
The experiment result suggests the emotional agents did perform significantly 
better than emotionless ones, but it was unable to significantly reflect the advantages 
from fully structured emotional agents over the ones of the partial architecture.
March 3, 2007
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Introduction
Emotion modelling has received increasingly more attention from various research 
disciplines over the past decades. Many researchers have taken investigations and 
studies on emotions, either in their theoretical aspect or application aspect, and have 
yielded a lot of contributions within different fields. For example, in the field of 
neuroscience Damasio (1994) and LeDoux (1989, 1996) revealed a significant 
understanding of emotions to peoples’ thinking process by analyzing the human brain 
section. Within cognitive science, Minsky (1986), Sloman (2001) and Anderson et 
al. (2004) proposed systematic mind architectures by taking account of emotions. In 
the field of computer science, Picard (1997), Velaquez (1997), and Gadanho and 
Hallam (2001) set up computational emotion models and in psychology Frijda 
(1986), Isen (1993) and Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) analyzed various emotional 
influences.
In this chapter, we will concentrate on the following two main questions or issues: 
Why do we need to do research on emotion? What is the current state of emotion 
theory research?
Why do we need to do research on emotion?
The most practical answer to the above question is to see if emotion theory can be 
beneficial to us in regard to solving some specific problems or improving our quality 
of life. There are three ways that emotion research can be considered and applied.
Firstly, emotion research may enhance human believability for game agents in
9
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virtual reality research and possibly in the entertainment industry. In game industry 
nowadays, game characters equipped with emotion architectures seem more attractive 
to human players than regular agents, as the former ones think and react like human 
beings do. For example, they could perform more rational and coherent behaviours 
or produce non-monotonic strategies while the regular agents do not. Consequently, 
such emotional agents are not able to create the engaging game environment that 
human players prefer. For instance, Champandard (Champandard 2003) developed a 
few emotional robots in the PC game “Quake2” that were able to operate emotionally 
in reaction to the stimulus of their environments. This was displayed through their 
loss of shooting accuracy when they are frightened or by their loss of perception when 
they are afraid. They are also able to dance when they are happy and victorious after 
winning a battle. Other examples of these types of behaviour can be found in 
(Velaquez 1998, Bozinovski 1999, Henninger et al. 2003, Marinier and Laird 
2004).
Some advanced topics surrounding emotional believability can be found in the 
virtual reality arena or the Human and Computer Interaction (HCI) field. Emotion 
theory, especially emotion modelling, is of great importance to the above two areas as 
it not only enables agents to behave like humans, but it is capable of making effective 
interactions with the human users (Gratch and Marsella 2004a, Gratch and 
Marsella 2004b, Tangury et al. 2003, Silva et al. 2001). One great achievement 
made in HCI regarding the adoption of emotion modelling is the Kismet robot which 
was developed by the Kismet laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
10
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USA. This robot is able to express rich facial expressions as human people do. 
Additionally, it is able to perceive peoples’ emotional states from their facial 
expressions or voices and make appropriate responses both verbally and/or physically.
Figure 1.1: Kismet Robot, Image courtesy o f  P. Menzel 
More complex topics in this area do not only include how to model emotions for
agents, but also how to enable agents to use emotion theory to correctly identify
human users’ emotions through their inputs, facial expressions, speech, pitches or
tones in order to provide better service (Liao et al. 2005, Busso et al. 2004, Picard
1997, Fernandez 2003, Neumann and Narayanan 2004). Such an application is
widely used in the electrical tutoring system as well. Emotion theory can serve as a
system to assess users’ emotional states and insure appropriate interventions by
applying different levels of knowledge to problem solving based on the subjects’
emotional states thereby greatly improving the users’ learning performance, (Conati
and Zhou 2002, D’Mello et al. 2005).
Emotions also enable computer agents to build flexible and adaptive mechanisms
capable of making quick responses to fast-changing environments as their experience
increases. Such a characteristic is especially useful when dealing with problems in
resource-limited environments such as time-constraint or energy-limited worlds,
(Wright 1996, Sloman 2001, Scheutz 2002), as the results are quick yet often
it
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sufficient solutions although such kind of solutions after the intervention of emotions 
are not always optimal. Still, many researchers support and claim that they have 
developed such emotional mechanisms (McCauley and Franklin 1998, Sloman 
2001, Botelho and Coelho 1998, Canamero 2003). Moreover, in the later part of this 
chapter I will elaborate on how Damasio applied his famous Somatic Markers 
Hypothesis, (Damasio 1994) to explain such a quick reflexive mechanism as emotion. 
In conjunction with this, McCauley and Franklin, (McCauley and Franklin 1998), 
once stated that “Emotions give us the ability to make an almost immediate 
assessment of situations. They allow us to determine whether a given state of the 
world is beneficial or detrimental without dependence on some external evaluation”.
In another paper written by Botelho and Coelho, (Botelho and Coelho 1998), the 
authors held a similar view as McCauley and Franklin and subscribed to the more 
affective appraisal instead of the traditional cognitive appraisal which helps agents 
evaluate the situations they face in a fast way. In their implementation, a long chain of 
cognitive rules can be condensed according to emotion-signals exhibited during the 
appraisal process. As a result of an affective appraisal based on emotions, the agents’ 
thinking processes, which are normally completed by the cognitive appraisal requiring 
much longer time frames, is accelerated.
A similar description was made by Sloman, (Sloman 2001, Sloman 2004), 
however, Sloman thought such a quick response mechanism was only a kind of 
byproduct of the intelligence and should not to be thought of as intelligence itself. On 
the other hand, Belavkin, (2001, 2003), brought solid arguments that rejected
12
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Sloman’s assertion, in which he conducted a series of experiments to validate an 
important fact that the learning process could be accelerated if appropriate emotional 
stimuli were imposed on the testing objects, rats. That is to say that if we admit that 
learning is an intrinsic part of the intelligence, then emotion no doubt, impels the 
learning process to be more efficient and faster.
The third advantage of doing emotion research is to identify certain “negative 
emotions” that can be overcome in the future. This viewpoint is contributed by 
(Scheutz 2004), who in his paper suggests that some kinds of emotion such as “guilt” 
or “infatuation” “can be construed as the loss of control of certain reflective processes 
that balance and monitor deliberative processes.” Actually, Scheutz’s suggestion had 
already been applied into Gratch and Marsella’s research (Gratch and Marsella 
2003), whereby they used their own emotion appraisal theory to detect such negative 
emotions, (e.g. over-confidence or fear), of soldiers in military planning and training, 
and how they coped with these emotions after they were identified.
In summation, emotion is of great importance as is its diversity in possible 
applications to fields such as entertainment, electrical tutoring, Artificial Intelligence 
(Al), and cognitive science. Based on the above statement, it is necessary for us to 
learn more about emotion itself, in order to build and tailor emotion modelling to fit 
our needs for specific purposes.
What is Emotion Theory about?
Emotion theory, unlike other research areas such as mathematics or classic physics
13
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that already have an acknowledged theory framework and foundation, holds different 
views, opinions and theories from multiple research areas such as psychology, 
neuroscience, biology, philosophy and cognitive science etc., and does not have a 
consensus regarding many aspects within the subject field, including the definition of 
emotion, the role of emotion or some certain phenomena relating to it.
Although arguments have lasted for decades, the presence of Damasio’s emotion 
theory, (Damasio 1994), seems to have gained the most recognition and support from 
the majority of emotion researchers. This is because his theory, from the position of 
neuroscience, has solid supporting experimental evidence. As a result, the rest of 
this section will first offer a short discussion on the definition of emotion, and then 
present an overview of Damasio’s emotion theory which explains what emotion 
actually is.
A Rough Definition of Emotion and Related Discussion
Emotion is a familiar but strange term to everyone. It is familiar as it is 
experienced every day by us, however, it also seems strange that we can not see, smell, 
hear or touch it. Instead, we can only conjecture about it through some perceived 
clues. For instance, some perceptible physiological changes like tearing may indicate 
excitement or sadness, sweating may indicate anxiety or nervousness. We also 
emote by means of facial expressions, speech, behaviours and so on.
Since emotion theory has its wide applications as the previous section introduced, 
our need to research it requires a clear definition of emotion. A commonly seen
14
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definition can be found from a website or a dictionary:
“An emotion, in psychology and common use, is an aspect of a human being's 
mental state, normally based in or tied to the person's internal (physical) and external 
(social) sensory feeling. (Wikipedia 2007)”.
“(Emotion is) the affective aspect of consciousness; (or) a state of feeling; 
(or) a conscious mental reaction (as anger or fear) subjectively experienced as 
strong feeling usually directed toward a specific object and typically 
accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body 
(Merriam-W ebster 2007)”.
The above definitions seem sufficient to cover the term “emotion” mentioned in 
our every day life. However, from the perspective of the research, especially for the 
sake of modelling, the definition seems in short of operation. For example, which 
causes the emotions, external or internal stimuli? What can the influence of emotion 
be? How can they affect our behaviour and thinking? Is emotion always the antithesis 
of the rational thinking? That is, does emotion only impose the negative influence on 
our deliberation process? Actually, many issues existed on the above aspects. For 
example in the first question above, some researchers insisted emotion can only be 
triggered from the external stimuli (William James in 1884 from (LeDoux 1996)), 
while others in converse claimed emotion could only be elicited from the internal of 
human minds (Glasser 1999). Some also argued that emotion can be triggered from 
both of the above sources (Ekman 2004). Even though, we can still choose an 
operational definition from varieties as the following shows:
15
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“Utilizing an uncomplicated view, emotions can be viewed and studied as simple 
patterned behavioral and physiological responses to specific stimuli (Gratch and 
Marsella 2003)”. Of course, like most other emotion researchers, Gratch and 
Marsella, did not base their full understanding of emotion on such a shallow level. 
Still, such a simple and plain explanation gives us an intuitive impression of emotion 
in that emotion refers to a study that focuses on building some “mapping 
relationships” between specific stimulus and the behaviours they give rise to.
Based on Damasio’s findings, (Damasio 1994), the above statement seems a little 
superficial from the perspective of neuroscience. Simple definitions such as this one 
and others, (the first definition of emotion proposed by William James in 1884), 
(LeDoux 1996), primarily deal with the manifestations of emotion and the possible 
mappings between stimuli and their responses. They overlook how emotion evolves 
and manifests within a person’s mind. Damasio’s emotion theory dealt with this 
issue and he regarded this internal process as an indispensable component of 
intelligence. The rest of this section will examine briefly the overview of Damasio’s 
emotion theory and will explain the emotion mechanisms to readers in a convincing 
way as a means to create a foundation for building my emotional model.
Review on Damasio’s Emotion Theory
Damasio’s emotion theory was built upon several important findings in the 
human brain, the most important being that emotions can be triggered in different 
cerebral pathways. The above proposition was originally inspired by Papez’s brain
16
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circuit theory of 1937; a theory about how the internal mechanisms of a creature’s 
brain copes with stimuli, (Ventura 2000). In brief, Papez’s findings uncovered the 
fact that external stimuli could be dealt with by the brain, (human or other creature), 
in two different pathways. The first pathway called “stream of feeling” forwards 
stimuli directly to the motion system which creates a body response. The other 
pathway called “stream of thought” redirects stimuli to several components of the 
brain to induce responses such as reasoning and deliberation before action. Two 
main realizations are noticeable from these findings. First, feelings are generated in 
both pathways and second, the processing time through pathway one is considerably 
shorter than through pathway two.
Papez’s brain circuit theory was consolidated by LeDoux’s research nearly sixty 
years later, (LeDoux 1996). LeDoux conducted a series of experiments to prove 
Papez’s brain circuit theory by examining the emotion of fear in rats. First, he 
proved Papez’s circuit theory by using the way of “parallel transmission, (see page 15 
of Ventura 2000)”, in that both ways of brain thinking went through amygdala, a 
brain area identified in LeDoux’s time as generating emotions. Furthermore, 
LeDoux tested the rats’ average time needed to direct acoustic stimuli to the amygdala 
in their brains. The data suggested that through pathway one, the time was twelve 
milliseconds but the time was almost doubled through pathway two. The second 
finding proved that pathway one, labelled by LeDoux as the “Thalamatic pathway”, 
required no or less thinking and was much faster than pathway two, labelled by 
LeDoux as the “Cortical pathway”. This said, the former pathway seemed to be less
17
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rational than the latter.
Based on the above facts, it makes sense to see that Damasio further divided 
emotions into two categories as those two types of emotions follow the different 
pathways in human brains, i.e. primary emotions through Thalamatic pathway, (or 
“basic emotions”), and secondary emotions through Cortical pathway. The former 
referred to some transient psychological states such as joy, fear, anxiety and anger 
while the latter contrarily referred to durative psychology states such as guilt, 
infatuation and so on. This kind of taxonomy is widely accepted and used in many 
emotion researchers’ papers because it is supported by experiments, and reveals the 
essence of the emotional process which happens to people and more broadly, 
creatures.
Damasio gave a reasonable illustration as to why he separated emotions. Such 
taxonomy was based on the experimental data collected from his brain lesion studies. 
These studies refer to the practical way in neuroscience in which the function of a 
certain brain area is examined by comparing the symptom induced by patients who 
have had damage to the brain area in question, with others who have had no such 
damage. He first investigated some old case studies in which patients who suffered 
from damage in prefrontal lobes, were not able to make as coherent a decision as a 
healthy person. For example, they were not able to allocate their time or energy 
toward a goal properly, they overly concentrated on sub-goals, they often lost their 
grasp on the overall situation, and so on. One fact which needs to be addressed is that 
the brain impaired patients had the equivalent IQ, (Intelligent Quality), level to
18
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normal people.
Damasio proposed in his own explanation to the above case studies that all 
emotions could be aroused by two distinct brain areas: amygdala and prefrontal 
cortices, (part of prefrontal lobes). The amygdala is responsible for producing 
physiological reactions towards external stimuli such as facial expression changes like 
laughing, crying and so on, or motions such as jumping, stomping and any other 
bodily responses like sweating. Damasio thought the arousal of primary emotions 
was ascribed to the amygdala. Prefrontal cortices, working on the top of amygdala, 
were in charge of activating secondary emotions based on the memory episodes of 
past events, which in turn triggered the amygdala to generate some emotional decision 
that was aligned with the secondary emotion. This explanation actually indicated that 
the abnormal behaviours made by the above test patients were a result of damage in 
the prefrontal cortices that resulted in the lack of the ability to generate secondary 
emotions to perform long term planning or deliberation. Moreover, it is easy to 
observe that Damasio’s explanation very closely parallels Papez’s brain circuit theory; 
while the former explicitly ascribed two kinds of brain thinking processes to two 
kinds of emotions.
Since the brain working mechanism related to emotions is given, Damasio further 
illustrated how one’s emotions greatly impacted one’s decision making process. In 
order to further bring this illustration to light, we need to first know and understand 
Damasio’s Somatic Markers Hypothesis. Then, evidence to support his hypothesis 
will be realized with only a brief explanation.
19
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Damasio abstracted his famous Somatic Markers Hypothesis based on the above 
categorization on emotions. The hypothesis is quoted below:
“In short, somatic markers are a special instance of feelings generated from 
secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected, by learning, 
to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios. When a negative somatic marker is 
juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination functions as an alarm bell. 
When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed instead, it becomes a beacon of 
incentive, (page 174 from (Damasio 1994)).”
From the above statement, we can learn the author presumed such “markers” 
were aroused from peoples’ secondary emotions. They help people to make choices 
by factoring in the remembered outcome marked by the markers. Negative or 
positive secondary emotions may lead people to make different choices in that 
negative emotions predicate a pessimistic future while positive ones an optimistic 
future.
Damasio further enumerated some features about somatic markers which were 
necessary for emotion modelling and so I have imported them with the following.
The first feature is that somatic markers only function as filters prior to the 
subsequent deliberation process, but they do not attend it in actuality. In other words, 
the markers only “highlight” those options sensitive to them and they will suggest that 
the subsequent deliberation process involve those emphasized options if those options 
are coherent to them; or, they will opt out of such options if those options are 
contradictive to them. No doubt such operations generally speed up people’s decision
20
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making process as they at least prune option nodes emotionally before deliberation.
The second feature is that somatic markers help people facilitate long term 
planning. Damasio emphasized the case that some option may produce immediate 
consequences which can lead to a positive outcome in the future. Working with 
understanding, positive somatic markers will help people to “endure sacrifices now in 
order to attain benefits later.”
To demonstrate the somatic markers hypothesis, the following evidence is picked 
up from Damasio’s book, (chapter 9 “Testing the Somatic-Marker Hypothesis” in 
Damasio 1994), with some explanation.
The most convincing experiment that illustrates the somatic markers hypothesis is 
Iowa Card Gambling Games, originally designed by Damasio’s post doctoral fellow 
Antoine Bechara. In this experiment, a group of patients with prefrontal cortiex 
damage and a group of normal subjects were both invited to play a card game. The 
rule was simple: in front of each player, (either a patient or normal subject), there was 
placed four decks of cards labelled A, B, C and D. Each player was assigned equal 
amount of fake money, say $2000 at the game’s start. Each player would have the 
opportunity to turn over a card from one of the four decks. Picking cards from A or 
B would earn $100 each time, but accidentally resulted in a fine that could be as high 
as $1250 if the card turned over directed the player to do so. On the other hand, 
picking cards from C or D would only earn $50 each time but only an occasional fine 
would have to be made and it was usually less than $100 on average. The goal of 
this game was to earn as much money from the decks as possible. Some restriction
21
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applied to the card game in order to eliminate interference from working memory so 
that the participants were not allowed to keep notes of their monetary states nor were 
they informed of their state during the experimentation process.
The experiment results were quite remarkable. The normal subjects drew cards 
from four decks equally at the outset of the game and converged their choices on deck 
C and D gradually until the game ended since most of them thought attempts in A and 
B seemed more risky than in C and D. Patients with prefrontal cortices damage 
behaved similarly to normal subjects at the initial stage, but drew cards from A and B 
more frequently as the experiment progressed. One more additional fact was that 
sometimes patients avoided choosing A or B if the last card drawn from those two 
decks received a penalty payment. Yet, the patients would soon begin choosing from 
deck A or B soon after which was different from the normal subjects.
To exclude other possibilities such as patients being sensitive to reward over 
punishment, Damasio and his students conducted the card game experiment one more 
time by inverting the order of reward or punishment. The conclusion was that they 
saw similar results as in the first experiment in that the patients still persisted in 
choosing cards from A and B which have higher gain but also the possibility of higher 
loss.
From this conclusion it seems that due to the inability to use somatic markers to 
mark past events, the patients failed to form biased opinions on those four decks as 
normal subjects did. Instead, the patient’s selection only depended on their 
momentary feeling induced by their basic emotions.
22
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The above experiment, in addition to other evidence enumerated in Damasio’s 
book, (see chapter 9 in (Damasio 1994), shows a potent arguments that emotion 
essentially provides rationality to the human decision making process although 
emotion can also result in irrationality, (page 193 in (Damasio 1994)).
In summary, through the above overview on Damasio’s emotion theory we can 
clearly apprehend the essence of emotion in that emotion is an indispensable factor to 
the human thinking process, and acts as a presupposition of efficiency and rationality 
to people’s deliberation and long term planning process.
Summary of the Introduction
In this chapter, two basic questions are addressed. One is why do we need to do 
research on emotion and the usefulness of emotion theory? The other is what on 
earth emotion theory is talking about? Regarding the first question, emotion can 
play several different roles and have several different applications in a variety of 
settings such as entertainment, electrical tutoring, military training, Al research and 
Health Sciences. As to question two, the emotion theory proposed by Damasio, 
having won the most recognition with its solid experimental support, has been given 
an understandable elucidation. Damasio’s emotion theory outlined a clear 
understanding of emotion from the neuroscience perspective, In other words, 
emotions should be categorized into two kinds of emotions: basic emotions 
characterized by transient and quick responses and less deliberation, and secondary 
emotions with the features of slow responses and deliberation involving past events or
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experiences. Finally, from Damasio’s Somatic Markers Hypothesis with experimental 
support, we clearly know the latter response exerts a great impact on the human 
decision making process, and people may lose rationality towards making long term 
planning without it. This hypothesis may also be a solid argument to refute the 
traditional view that emotion should be strictly excluded from intelligence.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Literature Review
In the previous chapter an introduction to emotion theory was discussed with a strong 
focus on Damasio’s findings in neuroscience. His emotion theory disclosed the 
important fact that emotions intrinsically brought positive contribution to humans’ 
thinking processes, especially to decision making. Despite the specifics of Damasio’s 
findings it is still necessary to more broadly consider the finding of others within the 
entire emotion research field. Furthermore, to fully apprehend a complete emotional 
process in one’s mind and make further simulation possible, we at least need to have a 
basic knowledge of the process. For example, we need to know how emotions are 
elicited, how they are formed in people’s minds, and how emotions influence people’s 
decision making or action selection process.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: a brief overview will first be 
given on the development of the emotion research field over past years and then a 
technical overview on the basic knowledge of the emotional process will be explored.
Past Works on Emotion Research
Issue on the Usefulness of Emotions to Intelligence
As was mentioned earlier, emotion is not a new research topic and can be traced back 
to 1884 when William James first proposed the definition for emotion, (LeDoux 
1996). Yet, before its wide applications were identified in science, emotion was 
traditionally thought to be a hindrance to any rational thinking, (Young 1943, Hebb
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1949, Toda 1993, McCarthy 1995). For example, McCarthy, (McCarthy 1995),
suggested that “robot[s] should not be equipped with human-like emotions”, as he 
sustained robots equipped with human-like emotions were far from intelligent robots. 
Some of McCarthy’s contemporaries disagreed with this view, (e.g. Sloman and 
Croucher 1981, Minsky 1986). Statements such as Minsky’s that cited “The question 
is not whether intelligent machines can have any emotions, but whether machines can 
be intelligent without emotions”, were considered by most emotion-usefulness 
supporters.
There was no doubt that Damasio’s findings were significantly advantageous for 
the arguments of emotion-usefulness advocators. After all, those findings originated 
from the study on brain lesion patients and could be regarded as solid evidence that 
emotions affected people’s thinking process positively, specifically in respect to 
decision making processes. They showed that without emotion support, people may 
not be able to make rational selections from among multiple options, or they lacked 
the ability to contemplate long term plans based on their past experiences. Not only 
Damasio, but other psychologists and neuroscientists came to similar conclusions that 
some positive emotions, such as happiness or joy, were able to help people deal with 
problems effectively, (Isen 2004), even if the plans were focused around survival, 
(Cacioppo et al. 2004). Recently, Lerner with her colleague, (Lerner and Keltner, 
2006), further discovered from their designed experiments that even some negative 
emotion such as anger could also produce some positive outcomes as it was able to 
capture more attention and control to cope with situations. However, Sloman, once a
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vanguard in emotion research along with Scheutz, still criticized the recent emotion 
research works, (Sloman 2001, Sloman 2004, Scheutz 2002, Scheutz 2004). They 
mostly thought emotion research misinterpreted Damasio’s findings and that emotion 
should be considered a byproduct of human intelligence and not the requirement for 
intelligence. The presence of intelligence need not accompany emotions. Sloman 
deemed the damage on humans’ brains lead to the loss of both intelligence and 
emotional elicitation and not the rise of intelligence. However, they did not design 
any experiment to support their arguments, nor did they set up any emotional 
experimentation to counter Damasio’s findings.
Although there has been controversy throughout the development of emotion 
theory, it has seemed that more and more scholars indeed contributed many positive 
results from emotion theories for AI. For example, emotions can alter people’s 
attention so that they turn their focus to a more relevant and current task (Frijda 
1986). Emotions were used to perform multiple goal management (Gadanho 2003). 
Emotion could also be used by agents as a useful assessment tool to evaluate their 
environments or situations so that agents can make appropriate responses by using 
cognitive appraisal (Elliot 1992, Gratch and Marcella 2004a, Gratch and Marcella 
2004b), affective appraisal (Botelho and Coelho 1998) or directly from Damasio’s 
Somatic Markers Hypothesis (Ventura 2000).
Past Works on Emotion Modelling
In the first chapter I introduced some of the broadly known applications of emotion
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theory that could be applied to various domains such as the entertainment industry, 
electric educational tutoring system design or health sciences. I also explained what 
emotion theory is from the perspective of neuroscience. Now, people may wonder 
how to connect these two concepts together in order to make the applications come 
into play. This is the main dilemma for computer scientists. Consequently, it is 
necessary for us to have a basic understanding of past emotion modelling works so we 
can tailor different emotion theories into practical agent models for use.
Considering emotions in computer science, particularly in AI, is not a novel idea 
since as early as in the 1960’s, (e.g. Simon 1967), scholars proposed some agent 
architectures which integrate emotions as one component. The real boost of emotion 
research in AI began with the wide acknowledgement of Damasio’s emotion theory; 
along with other positive findings about the role of emotion in relation to intelligence 
within the fields of neuroscience and psychology, (e.g. Isen 1993, LeDoux 1996, 
Estrada et al. 1997, Isen 2004). As a matter of fact, many scholars in this field were 
mostly motivated by Damasio’s findings. Some of them totally adopted Damasio’s 
emotion theory to develop their own framework, (Ventura 2000), others further built 
upon it, (Sloman 1998, Sloman 2001, Wright 1997), while others used Damasio’s 
emotion theory to develop their own research works, (e.g. Picard 1997, Canamero 
1997, McCauley and Franklin 1998, Hudlicka 2004).
In order to summarize past works of emotion modelling, we can categorize them 
according to the research motivations behind them.
Building emotion architectures is important for exploring and understanding the
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human mind from the perspectives of philosophy and or cognition science (Sloman 
1998, Sloman 2001, Wright 1997, Ventura 2000, Hudlicka 2004, Velaquez 1997, 
Velaquez 1998, McCauley and Franklin 1998). Within this category, the Sloman’s 
CogAff (the abbreviation of “Cognition and Affect”) project was the most dominant. 
It proposed a clearly-dividing emotional agent structure which defined expandable 
and flexible interactions between layers, and also it offered well-adapted and 
reasonable extensions to Damasio’s theory. In contrast, Sloman’s theory was 
controversial and arguable since there was no experimental data or solid evidence to 
support his works.
Velaquez’s works, (Velaquez 1997, Velaquez 1998), were also heavily 
referenced and discussed by many researchers as it was easily adoptable and nicely 
synthesized various emotion theories from psychology into one computable 
framework. The difficulty was that his work was somewhat mysterious in that he was 
not able to offer enough implementation details from the emotion theory he referred 
to and he lightly glossed over many complicated issues within cognitive science, such 
as issues of memory. For example, he described his mechanical dog design as able to 
make use of secondary emotions to retrieve memory. He claimed that if similar 
stimuli were received again, the past experience could be retrieved from memory and 
could influence the selection of current actions. The problem was that he did not give 
a convincing statement regarding how to carry out the above processes as he did not 
explain how memory issues on the human brain work such as how memory is stored 
and retrieved. He also did not offer any explanation as to how to sort out duplicate or
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similar memories for capacity issues or how the retrieved memory episode influenced 
the selection of behaviours either by altering intensity of action values or by 
influencing current motivation states.
On the contrary, Ventura’s emotion model, (Ventura 2000), which was greatly 
influenced by Damasio’s emotion theory, presented three feasible emotion models 
which loyally reproduced Somatic Markers mechanisms within his double layer 
framework. Also, this work offered a well-defined mechanism to address some 
cognitive issues such as memory management mentioned above.
Endeavours in seeking any possibility to connect learning process with emotions 
were also a remarkable motivation for emotion modelling. As mentioned in the first 
chapter, such attempts were once made by various scholars. For example, the 
approach of reinforcement learning theory combined with hormone mechanism, 
(Gadanho and Hallam 2001), showed that the constant release of certain hormones 
related to emotions such as fear could reinforce learning in a certain situation. The 
affective appraisal theory (Botelho and Coelho 1998), a theory close to Damasio’s 
somatic markers hypothesis claimed that attaching emotion signals to every situation 
experienced lead to learning the correct choice or positive response by means of 
retrieving some memory episode. This in turn resulted in creating a compilation of 
sequential historic rules which would generate an emotional signal thereby the 
compilation process would speed up the rules of retrieval the next time by identifying 
the matched emotion signals.
Belavkin, (Belavkin 2003), offered a new perspective regarding emotions as one
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kind of stimulus, like noise, which could affect a creature’s learning process. In his 
view, the emotional process during learning was termed the Simulated Annealing 
Process in AI. In other words, appropriate emotional stimulus in the initial stage of 
learning could lead to a diversity of attempts. In turn, cooling down or a reduction 
of emotional stimuli occurred when the performance was satisfactory, and warming 
up could again be performed by increasing emotional stimuli if the goal or 
environment changed.
How to make communication effective between humans and computers is another 
important research area in emotion modelling. Most research and work within this 
category involve a strong application background. Some things being considered in 
this work are “Why do we need to do research on emotion.” Most application work 
stemmed directly from the emotion theories of psychology, cognitive science or 
neuroscience and even from AI itself. For instance, Picard, (Picard 1997), once 
adopted HMM (Hidden Markov Model) to imitate people’s emotional state transition 
process. He also indirectly borrowed some architectures or learning ideas from the 
first and second research motivations explained above. In Gratch and Marcella’s work, 
virtual reality or virtual army training, could be considered as one of the applications 
of cognitive appraisal introduced in the second category of motivation.
A Theoretical Review on Emotion Modelling
The previous section was mainly an exploration of the developments in emotional 
research over the past years. In this section, the focus will shift to how to model
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emotions. That is, various opinions will be presented regarding sub-courses that can 
form a complete emotional process which normally includes the following procedures 
in sequential order: the categorization of emotions, the elicitation of emotions, 
different descriptions of the emotional process, and the emotional influences on action 
selection or decision making.
Discussion on the Categorization of Emotions
It should be said that not every emotion scholar made explicit categorization of 
emotions before conducting research due to different research focuses, but they at 
least implicitly grouped different emotions into two sets: positive effects or negative 
effects. This approach was called valence based emotion research. According to 
Lerner and Keltner, (Lerner and Keltner 2000), a valence based approach seemed 
unreasonable all the time because some emotions with the same valence may have 
different appraisal outcomes for the same given stimulus which could be either object 
or event. To prove this assertion, the authors conducted an experiment to compare fear 
and anger, both negative valence emotions, to appraise risk perception. The result of 
the experiment showed that fearful people tended to make pessimistic judgements 
while angry people held contrasting opinions, eventually feeling optimistic about the 
future.
In view of the above fact, it is necessary to discuss the categorization of emotions 
as this does not only remind scholars of the specificity that exists among different 
emotions, but also enables them to focus on a specific research area after
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categorization. As mentioned in the last chapter, Damasio divided emotions into basic 
emotions and secondary emotions according to their different functional mechanisms 
in the human brain. So, what are these emotions that we experience in our daily life? 
Izard, (Izard 1991), listed eleven different kinds of basic emotions according to the 
Factor Analysis he proposed, while Ekman (Ekman 1992) produced a shorter version 
containing only six emotions considered primary emotions. These emotions are 
anger, fear, sadness, happiness, disgust and surprise. Ekman’s division is most widely 
accepted by emotion researchers from different disciplines such as psychology and 
cognitive science. For instance, psychologists always seem to choose one or two 
primary emotions from their subjects in order to discover the useful properties 
pertaining to specific emotions, (Isen 1993, Isen 2004, Cacioppo et al. 2004, Mellers 
2004, Lerner and Keltner 2001, Lerner and Keltner 2006). Isen specialized in 
the research of positive emotions such as happiness and joy and concluded that 
positive emotions, as opposed to negative emotions could result in faster and more 
creative decisions. Lerner et al. discovered that anger, a negative emotion, does not 
always produce a negative outcome. It can lead to a positive result since it is an 
attention grabber and strongly manifests in the mind.
Ekman’s division of emotions was not a very unique way to classify emotions. 
A common way of classification is to regard all basic emotions as consisting of a 
group of dimensions, while each of them has different value distributions. Smith and 
Ellsworth (Smith and Ellsworth 1985) suggested that there are six aspects by which 
to measure one’s emotional state. These are certainty, pleasantness, intentional
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activity, control, anticipated effort and responsibility. A simpler version of the above 
division method can be found in Mehrabian’s P.A.D theory, (Mehrabian 1995) 
whereby Mehrabian used only three dimensions to represent the diversity of emotions. 
In the P.A.D. theory, P stood for Pleasure-displeasure, A for Arousual-nonarousual 
and D for Dominance-submissiveness. The first dimension marked one emotional 
valence, (positive effect or negative one), the second dimension reflected the 
combination of physical and mental processes, and the last one was the property that 
controlled the intensity of the emotion, (i.e. if the emotion was able to influence 
people to a great or lesser extent). As a result, all emotional states that people 
normally experience could be succinctly represented by the above three dimensional 
vectors with different values scaled from -1 to 1; such as anger (-0.51, 0.59, 0.25), and 
elation (0.50, 0.42, 0.23). Furthermore, P.A.D actually categorized emotions into 
eight different groups with different combinations of (+/- P), (+/- A) and (+/- D).
In contrast, emotion research in computer science has not strictly followed either 
of the two division methods suggested above. Some scholars simplified emotions into 
valence based groups, (negative or positive), as computer scientists have a different 
research emphasis on emotion than psychologists or cognitive scientists. For 
example, in computer science emotion research may be focused on how to integrate 
emotions into AI, or how to make improvements regarding how AI can be better 
served by emotion theory. This only requires that scholars only examine the overall 
effects or characteristics of emotions. For example, as the last chapter showed, the 
applications of emotion theory for computer scientists need to involve a “fast and
34
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
reflexive” connection between the emotion and the designed agent model, (McCauley 
and Franklin 1998, Botelho and Coelho 1998, Belavkin 2001). On the other hand, 
there are some emotion researchers with computer science backgrounds that still 
adopt one of the above categorizations for emotion modelling, (Velasquez 1997, 
Velasquez 1998, El-Nasr et al. 2000, Gadanho and Hallam 2001, Henninger et al. 
2003, Tanguy 2003).
Emotions and Elicitations
To model emotions in a specific domain, we need not only to decide on which 
categorization method we should adopt to extract a relevant subset of emotions, but 
also to consider how to elicit those chosen emotions in the specified environment.
At the very early stage of emotion research, emotions were thought to be the 
result of specific external stimuli, (Watson 1929), For instance, hunger or a threat 
would cause a feeling of fear, and loss of parent would induce a feeling of grief.
Later on, the above idea was challenged by various appraisal theories. Generally 
speaking, most emotion theorists thought emotions were elicited by a human’s own 
appraisal of the stimuli they received.
The conventional opinion in appraisal theory is that emotions are mainly 
triggered by a human’s own cognition and interpretation of external events and not the 
events per se. Such cognition processes that elicit emotions are called “cognition 
appraisals” and are widely used by many emotion researchers. Ortony et al., 
(Ortony et al. 1988, Elliott 1992, Reilly 1996, Gratch and Marsella 2004b). Frijda
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(Frijda 1986), held a similar opinion but further elaborated that emotions were not 
elicited because of the happening of events, but because the events happened. For 
example, Frijda explained that “positive emotions can be said to result from events 
that represent a match: actual or signalled concern satisfaction. Negative emotions 
result from events that represent a mismatch: actual or signalled interference with 
concern satisfaction (page 278, Frijda 1986).”
Botelho and Coelho (1998) once claimed that they created a more advanced 
appraisal theory called “affective appraisal” than the cognitive appraisal theory 
(Elliott 1992), which was briefly mentioned previously from the perspective of 
learning (Botelho and Coelho 1998). They believed the affective appraisal 
contained a much more condensed and concise appraisal process than the cognitive 
appraisal.
Normally, a complete cognition appraisal consists of three steps to eliciting 
emotions, (Elliott 1992). The first step is to interpret a confronted situation. The 
second step is to compare the interpreted result from step one to the motives (goals or 
concerns for example). The last step is to elicit emotion(s) which are relevant to the 
comparison result from the previous step. On the contrary, Affective appraisal, 
according to (Botelho and Coelho 1998), explicitly connected a given situation to a 
related emotion. Such direct mappings were accumulated due to the aforementioned 
compilation process. That said, affective appraisal may not be able to reflect the 
variety of responses that emotions can generate since the mechanism can only map a 
certain situation to a fixed emotional state as long as the rule remains invariant.
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Cognition appraisal can produce different emotional results since it is capable of 
handling different interpretations to the same situation according to different internal 
motives structures. Such interpretations can be made through EECRs, (Emotion 
Eliciting Condition Relations), (Elliott 1992), or through concerns, (Frijda 1986), or 
through emotion structures which include goals, drives and motivations, (Reilly
1996).
Ekman, (Ekman 2004) put more emphasis on another form of emotion elicitation 
called automatic appraisals which had two features. One was to elicit emotions in a 
very fast way and unconscious way, and the other was to struggle for the most 
important need, such as those regarding “welfare or survival”. He also provided us 
with an exhaustive analysis about the conditions which were able to elicit emotions, 
and generalized them into nine categories including automatic appraisals. I will 
mention some of them in the next paragraph.
External stimuli are not the only generators of emotions as internal stimuli can 
result in emotions as well. Ekman (Ekman 2004) generalized two ways that the 
human mind could elicit emotions. They are the recalling of a past emotional 
experience, and imagination. Most scholars seemed more interested in the recalling 
of experience due to its applicability. Intrinsically, recalling past emotional 
experiences refers to the process of self evaluation for future improvement. This is 
one more form of appraisal in conjunction with the other appraisal types introduced 
above. Some emotion scholars also stated that emotions elicited from the human mind, 
have an “anticipatory effect”, (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003), such as
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“introspection”, (Wright et al. 1996), and “belief and sentiment”, (Frijda et al. 2000). 
The above concepts and various views in about the emotion process will be discusses 
in the next section.
Review of the Emotional Process in Our Mind
How do the elicited emotions work in our mind before they produce some emotional 
signals that influence our behaviours or decisions? In this section, several typical 
emotion theories or models will be briefly discussed as they interpret the emotional 
process from different perspectives. Those models include Sloman’s three layer 
mind architecture as a typical emotional process, (Wright et al. 1996, Sloman 1998, 
Sloman 2001); Loewenstein and Lerner’s emotional decision-making theory 
(Loewenstein and Lerner 2003); Frijda’s emotion theory (Frijda 1986, Frijda et al. 
2000, Frijda 2004); and Elliot’s affective reasoning (Elliot 1992). Many other 
emotion theories can also be found but the emotion theories listed above are sufficient 
enough to explain how emotions work in our brains.
Sloman’s Three Layers Mind Structure
Sloman and his colleagues, who set up their “CogAff” project in 1991, were 
considered the pioneers in emotion modeling, (Wright et al. 1996, Sloman 1998, 
Sloman 2001). Their emotion model was first well implemented in Wright’s PhD 
dissertation (Wright 1997) while Sloman later added new ideas to it, (see Wright’s 
PhD dissertation, Wright 1997, for details). Sloman et al. viewed emotions inside the
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human mind as the result of millions of years of evolution. Consequently, they 
thought human’s minds were too complex to be fully understood unless correct 
layering architectures were applied.
Their proposed architecture consisted of three layers: the reactive layer, the 
deliberative layer and the meta-management layer. In their explanation, the first layer 
was shared by most creatures on the Earth. Its function is to store rules that 
empowered creatures to cope with the many situations they had met or inherited from 
their ancestors. Their evidence was based on the examination of some insects’ 
habitual activities (e.g. fight or flight). The deliberative layer as they suggested 
operated on top of the reactive layer as the contemplating component such as 
conceiving plans before actions. Such a characteristic was able to save the storage 
space required by the reactive layer, and is abundant in most primates. For example, 
chimpanzees knew to move boxes to raise themselves in order to reach bananas hung 
on the roof of a house. The third layer, the meta-management layer, which is on top of 
the deliberative layer, has the ability to choose one strategy from multiple options 
conceived by the deliberation layer; similar to the deliberation layer choosing actions 
from the reaction layer. The third layer could also be used to explain more complex 
phenomena found in most of humankind such as some less perceived moods, (called 
“tertiary emotions”), like jealousy or infatuation. It is characterized as gaining or 
losing control, or attention affected by the two bottom layers.
Aside from the above “three layers conjecture” about the human mind, Sloman 
further gave rise to his “Information Processing Theory” as figure 2.1 shows. In
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general terms, Sloman regarded an agent’s mind as the centre for processing 
information from stimuli captured by its perception system and also delivering control 
signals to its action system after processing. This is the usual way in which a regular 
agent deals with information, (Russell and Norvig 2003). Furthermore, Sloman 
diversified the pathways of information flows between an agent’s perception system 
and its mind system, and between its mind system and its action system. Additionally, 
Sloman divided both the perception system and the action system into three levels of 
sophistication to match the three layers in the mind architecture. Yet, he did not 
label those different sophistication levels as “Reactive”, “Deliberative” and 
“Meta-management” as with the layers in the mind architecture, as those terms may 
not be accurate when applied to the above two systems. Instead, the different 
sophistication degrees were labelled as “low”, “middle” and “high”.
Emotion, according to Sloman’s description, served as an alarm system which 
was able to direct stimuli to a certain layer of an agent’s perception system. The 
perceived result was then sent to one or more appropriate layers in the mind to 
concurrently deal with it. Finally the produced control signal was sent to a layer in 
the action system. A simple explanation of this is as follows: The human mind is
comprised of three systems: the perception system, mind architecture and the motion 
system. Each system is composed of three layers whereby the higher level is always 
more capable of dealing with received information than the lower level. Emotion is 
the state from which it is determined which layer in the above three systems will deal 
with received information. In other words, emotion can forward the stimuli to the
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first layer of the perception system resulting in a simple perception or interpretation. 
Then the perceived result is directed to the second layer or the deliberative layer of 
the mind architecture to resulting in middle level thinking. Finally, the forwarded 
result form the mind architecture level is sent to the one of the three layers of the 
motion system resulting in the appropriate action.
Emotion, once receiving a stimulus, can determine which layer(s) of the mind 
will deal with the information and deliver the processed result to the appropriate 
action system depending on the urgency of the emotional state. For instance, lower 
urgency may send stimuli to a higher level of the perception or the mind system for 
processing if there is enough time for deliberation and selection. Sloman did not give 
a precise elucidation of how to run the alarm mechanism or how to use the alarm 
signal to form different information flows throughout the mind’s architecture. He 
believed more cognitive processes needed exploring before consummating his 
conjecture on a person’s mind since he claimed that people’s minds were too complex 
to be fully understood. Regardless of such a deficiency, Sloman’s three layers mind 
architecture provided a practical and self-contained theoretical framework for our 
further extension.
Although the control mechanism for information flow was unclear, Sloman still 
proposed some possible information flows. For example, he exemplified one flow that 
was shaped like the Greek letter Omega “ ”. To illustrate it, we can imagine the 
following scenarios: someone perceived a squirrel as a rat-like animal because they 
had never seen squirrels before but were familiar with rats, (middle degree
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perception). In turn, the person was afraid of it because she considered that she was 
afraid off all rodents, (meta-management deliberation where abstraction exists). So, 
they decided to leave their environment, (middle degree action as a high level of plan 
was presented). This example outlines a rough impression of how Omega 
Information Flow works in people’s minds. For the sake of clarification, two more 
examples are provided: First, if someone sees a rat, (low degree perception as no 
associative perception exists), and they felt disgusting, (reactive response), then they 
may begins to step backwards unconsciously (low degree action). This example 
illustrates a purely reactive information flow. The second example is if someone 
perceived a squirrel but had never seen one before, (low degree perception as no 
associative perception), and they felt disgusting because they thought the squirrels 
looked like rats and they had a disdain for rats, (deliberation as reasoning), then they 
began to step backwards unconsciously (low degree action), this would be an example 
of a lower Omega Information flow.
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Figure 2.1 Three-Layer Architecture o f  MIND, by Courtesy o f  Aaron Sloman. The 
Bright Red Arrow was added by Yan M a to reflect the Omega Information Flow  
proposed by Sloman. A bidirectional arrow denotes an interaction between two layers 
within a system or two systems. The spreading blue arrows from  the alarm system  
denote the alarm signals can be transmitted to any layers within a system or two 
systems. The pink arrows pointing to the alarm system denote feedbacks from  all other 
parts o f  the entire mind architecture to the alarm system. An arrow within one box 
indicates an isolated inner thinking process within a layer o f  the mind. The tree-like 
structure within the deliberative layer or the meta-management layer denotes a type o f  
deliberation process. The bar between two layers within a system refers to filters which 
can block excessive interactions depending on the urgency level.
Furthermore, Sloman’s design based on how people’s minds work is basically 
consistent with Damasio’s emotion theory. His reactive layer could be mapped to the 
amgydala which is in charge of controlling basic emotions to produce reflexive
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behaviours; while the deliberative layer was mapped to prefrontal lobes of the brain, 
which are for secondary emotions that conceive long term plans or make deliberations. 
What is novel about Sloman’s conjecture is that he believed that a higher layer, the 
meta-management layer, was required to better manage the deliberation process. The 
idea seemed to leave more free space for exploring the mechanisms regarding how 
long term processes affected what happened in the lower deliberative layer. In my 
opinion, (which was influenced by Frijda), (Frijda et al. 2000), the 
meta-management layer is the suitable place for a belief system or other long term 
concept such as mood or personality. In order to keep agents always conscious of 
their experiences and history, the layer is expected to mediate agents to form some 
consistent thinking process similar to humans.
Frijda’s Emotion Theory
Frijda’s emotion theory (Frijda 1986, Frijda et al. 2000, Frijda 2004) and his
joint implementation with Swagerman (Frijda and Swagerman 1987) provided a 
new link between emotions and evolution. That is, he regarded the emotion process as 
able to self-evolve over time. From the perspective of cognition, Frijda refined 
emotions into concerns and motivations. Those finer components were the right 
elements to bring evolution to emotions. The latter was able to modify emotions and 
action readiness to a certain event or object, while the former is relevant to the 
formation of beliefs.
The disposition of concern, according to (Frijda 1986), was defined as “a
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disposition to desire oec:...... c or non-occurrence of a given kind of situation”.
This referred to the emotional, perceptual and interpretational process. That is, when 
some event or stimulus occurred, if it was perceived or interpreted as impinging on 
some concerns one had, it could elicit certain emotions. In (Frijda et al. 2000), the 
authors further pointed out that each emotion had its own concerns towards an object. 
When the stimulus, which could be either an object or an event, manifested some 
characteristic relevant to some concerns, the belief for or in that characteristic would 
be created or strengthened by the emotion holding the corresponding concerns.
Beliefs could be formed or strengthend due to constant stimuli and the related 
emotions would be stabilized during the process and form “sentiments” (Frijda et 
al .2000). According to Frijda’s description, emotion could be elicited by the appraisal 
result, whether “beneficial or harmful”, that was attached to the presence of certain 
stimuli. Such an appraisal result was a prototype of a belief called the temporal belief. 
When the same stimuli were eventually realized by someone in a stable and 
meaningful sense, (i.e. it always resulted in the similar outcome by one’s perception 
and interpretation), the emotional response to these stimuli would be stabilized and 
appeared similarly. Such dispositional emotional responses were called “sentiments”, 
and the temporal belief would become a long term belief in the meantime.
Moreover, when a situation related to the belief was presented, the belief would 
manifest its strength by releasing the dispositional emotions, which were called 
“emotion anticipation” in (Frijda et al. 2000). The strength originated from the 
belief that could potentiate the current emotional state if the stimuli were consistent
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with the belief, while being resistant to change even if the stimuli are presented with 
contradictive information.
In turn, motivation referred to the impulsion to satisfy the elicited emotions 
concern or goal, and therefore, it would suggest choosing the action or strategy 
pertinent to the concerned object or event. The relationship between motivation and 
action was evolutionary and the former could “potentiate relevant action dispositions”, 
“either because a link between the two was wired in, by previous experience, or 
perhaps by some ‘insight’ into what a to-be-executed action can achieve. (Frijda 
2004). In the above quotation, the “action dispositions” actually refer to what is called 
“action readiness”, the tendency to execute a certain action. Similarly, the relation 
between emotion and its involved motivations is not fixed in that emotion may change 
its own motivation through the appraisal outcome from stimuli.
From the above statement, we can infer that Frijda’s refinement of emotions 
indeed could bring self-improvement during the entire emotional process. In the 
formation of belief, it would be useful to enable agents to choose current responses 
consistent with its past emotional experience; and the dynamics in motivation 
embodies the adaptability of emotions.
Loewenstein and Lerner’s Emotion Theory
Loewenstein and Lerner’s emotion theory mainly deals with emotional decision 
making processes, (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). The framework they proposed 
has a general meaning to our emotion research as it hypothesized a self-contained
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theoretic framework to explain the emotional process running in people’s minds.
The authors hypothesized two emotional effects coexisting in people’s minds at 
any moment: the incidental influences and the anticipatory influences. The former is 
generated because some occasional stimuli have happened, while the latter refers to 
some effect produced from expected consequences and the emotions attached to the 
expected emotion. The expected emotion is the emotion which cannot be experienced 
at the decision making point but experienced before it, and possibly after it, when the 
expected consequence became true. For example, we may feel excited before we 
buy a lottery ticket as we’ve already anticipated the exciting consequence of winning 
the top prize. Since the incidental influence is often contradictive to the anticipatory 
influence, “the immediate emotions associated with thinking about the consequences 
of a decision will differ in intensity and quality from the emotion experienced when 
the consequence occurs. (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003)”
Some interesting findings can be discovered in the fact that the work of 
Loewenstein and Lerner, and the work of Frijda both mentioned the function of 
“expected emotions”, (which is called “emotion anticipation” in Frijda’s work). By 
applying Frijda’s explanation on the power of belief, it is easy to explain why 
immediate emotions often diverge from the expected emotions since expected 
emotions can be one kind of dispositional emotion that originated from the belief: 
The power to persist in a certain opinion which may conflict with the incidental 
influence currently received.
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Models Implementing the Reactive Component Principal
In comparison to the above models, which show in depth the emotional process in the 
human mind, some emotion models did not explore it. Instead, they were designed as 
reactive machines which were wired with large amounts of rules that mapped defined 
situations to certain actions, (Ortony et al. 1988, Elliot 1992, Reilly 1996). Part of 
the implementation works from (Champandard 2003) are thought to fall into this 
category. Those models were actually rich emotion-action representation platforms, 
on top of which implementations were allowed to build up for various purposes, such 
as testing psychology theories (Elliot 1992), electrical art and recreation (Reilly 1996, 
Champandard 2003).
The reason those models are thought to be reactive is that almost all the mappings 
between situations and emotions, and emotions and actions are deterministic. 
Furthermore, the consideration of emotions is irrelevant to adaptation or learning. For 
instance, (Elliot 1992) carried out twenty four emotion types defined in (Ortony et al. 
1988) and one thousand four hundred emotion induced actions. Each time the 
observed situation will be assessed according to nine attributes each of which may 
have two or more different values, and each emotion has three innate attributes 
connected to actions, and those attributes have finer optional values as well, the span 
of which could produce diverse combinations each of which connects to some specific 
responding action. Such lexicon-looking-up style was presented with rich 
representations between actions and emotions because of complex hard wired
relationship, not because of deliberation or other intelligent components suggested by
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Sloman.
In conclusion, agents with reactive component only have no or unobvious 
emotional process in their minds.
Review on Decision Making or Action Selection Process
After the emotion is processed by a human’s mind, it can make the final decision on
what action or strategy could be chosen next.
Abundant literature regarding this issue can be found. However, in the
computational sense, the usual way to make decisions or selections is that the option
with the extreme value, either maximum or minimum, will be elected; that is also the
well-known strategy in the “winner-takes-all” strategy. For example, in (Valequez




In the above formula, /,, is the intensity of emotion e at the time t; % is the 
saturation threshold; tl/C/^.j) is the last intensity after decay through the function
\|/(); ^ Lke is the sum of support received from all elicitors, and ^ Gle»lh is the
k  I
sum of support received from the friend emotions, and is the sum of
m
objection received from the opposite emotions. Each time the emotion with the 
maximum emotion intensity will be elected to control the current emotion system. 
Similar approach could be found in (Gadanho and Hallam 2001).
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Although the computation for this selection is monotonous, the criteria vary. 
The most commonly occurring variation is the cost-benefit assumption that assumes 
people always chose the “good enough” option that balances the expected gain and 
the cost. It is represented by Anderson’s ACT-R theory (Anderson 1991, Anderson 
et al. 2004) where ACT-R stands for “Adaptive Control of Thought - Rational”. Its 
mathematical form is as below:
In the above formula, Ui is the utility of the i th option; Pt is the probability of 
achieving the goal by choosing option i ; G  is the expected gain of the current goal; 
and the Ci is the cost of executing option i . Certainly, the option with the maximum 
utility according to (2.1) will be elected for execution.
Belavkin (Belavkin 2003) contributed an innovative prospective to Anderson’s 
work. Instead of making selections according to the maximum utility strategy, he 
proposed the idea of choosing the option with minimum ratio of expected effort to 
benefit under more constrained conditions, Poisson distribution.
In the above formula, x denotes an optional solution; C(x)  denotes the 
expected cost; k(x)  is the number of trial times, and C(x) is the past cost which is 
the ratio of past effort to past trial times plus 1 (see (2.4) below), i;(C(x)) is the 
randomly generated noise that is used to resolve conflicts in the initial stage (see (2.5) 
below), i.e. when the trial time is small. Here,
U ^ P P - Q ( 2 .2 )
k ( x ) C ( x ) + £ ( C ( x ))
(2.3)
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Where t (x) denotes the effort (time) spent previously, and n(x) is the number
of successes with the effort.
i;(C(x)) = rand e (0,2C(x)) (2.5)
Belavkin (Belavkin 2003) further suggested the expected cost derived from (2.3)
could be thought of as the optimal moment to give up one solution. In other words,
when the effort that has been spent is greater than the expected cost, we may choose
to give up the current solution and switch to another. It is done so because it has
been proven that the optimal moment to register the first time of success is “when the
probability of success equals the probability of failure”, if the distribution of the
solution obeyed the Poisson distribution (see page 103 of Belavkin 2003 for details).
Thagard (Thagard 2002) once proposed a connectionist network HOTC02 (Hot
Coherence 2) to make emotional decisions. The main idea behind the theory was to
choose most coherent hypothesis when emotional coherence was reached in the given
environment. “Coherence” in the context of his connectionist network, meant there
was no obvious change between the candidate hypothesis nodes and the evidence
nodes within the network. To elaborate how HOTC02 works, we must first
understand his early coherence theory ECHO.
ECHO, as explained by Wang (Wang 1998), stands for “Explanatory Coherence
by Harmony Optimization”, and is a connectionist network composed of two groups
of units: proposition units and evidence units. Each unit has its activation value to
reflect its own potential for influence. For example, the greater the activation value
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of a node is, the greater influence it is able to exert on its linked nodes. Such a kind 
of influence between two linked nodes could be positive or negative and it is 
determined by their linking weight. This means that the positive linking weight 
indicates the supporting relationship between two nodes, and negative linking weight 
indicates the opposing relationship.
ECHO can be used to make belief revision, as it is able to inference the most 
coherent hypothesis from the presented evidence after updating the activation values 
and linking weights of all the active nodes. This updating process will be briefly 
introduced two paragraphs down, and more detailed information about it can be found 
in the works of Thagard (1989) and Wang (1998). Wang (1998) made improvement 
on ECHO and derived his own concept which he called UECHO (Uncertainty-aware 
ECHO) that features a dynamically updating ECHO network by adding the 
consideration of sequential evidence and the ability to quickly converge to the most 
coherence proposition by updating the linking weights.
We cam start a quick review of how UECHO works. When setting up a UECHO 
network, a harmony value should be specified before running the network. It is the 
criterion to judge if the entire UECHO reaches the harmony. When we run the 
UECHO, if the final output value is less than the harmony value, we say the entire 
network is harmonized and the proposition with the maximum value can be elected as 
the output of the decision.
When one event is perceived, it is sent to the SEU (Special Evidence Unit), which 
is used to transfer perceived events to their representative evidence units. SEU
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performs the sequential evidence updating. It resets the linking weight between 
evidence units that represent the perceived events and SEU itself to the original value 
(which is also the maximum value in UECHO, say 1.0, so as to indicate the perceived 
events present the latest evidence). Also, the SEU weakens its linking weights with 
other evidence units, some of which can be disabled if the values of the linking 
weights are below the specified lower bound such as 0.01. The linking weight 
updating formula is displayed as below:
LW (t  + l) = L W ( t H l - d ) ' [‘ (2.6)
WhereLWt is the linking weight at the loop t, d  is the decay rate given the 
value of 0.9 under my implementation.
After updating the linking weights between SEU and Evidence Units (EUs), it 
starts updating the ones between EUs and Proposition Units (PUs), also called 
Hypothesis Units, in order to obtain the net input for each node. This process is 
identical to (2.6). The change in linking weight between a PU P U i and its linked 
evidence evk is:
Aw(evk,PU,)  =
a*(Actmax -  ActPU )»Act (evk and P U i positively linked) 
-a»(A c tPU -  Actmm )-Actev (evk and P U i negatively linked)
(2.7)
In this equation Actmax and Actmin denote the maximum and minimum value 
within the network, say 1 and -1 respectively, and a  is a constant coefficient with a 
positive value less than 1, say 0.3. The new linking weight between P U i and evk 
at the moment of t+1 is updated as:
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(2 .8)
In this equation wmax and wmin represent the upper and the lower thresholds, 1 
and -1 respectively, and they are used to normalize the produced linking weight.
The net input for a node e, , which can be either a PU or an EU, at the loop t+1 is 
the sum of all linked nodes activation values multiplying their linking weights:
Here, Actmn and Act^  represent the upper and lower thresholds, 1 and -1 
respectively, and they are used to normalize Acte (t + 1); 6  is the decay rate for the 
old activation A cte (?), say 0.05.
Given the net input values for all the nodes within the network, the sum of all the 
net inputs in the loop t+1 is:
(2.9)
According to (2.9), the activation for et can be updated as:
Actej (? +  !) = <
Actgj (?>(1 -  6) + netBi (t + 1 )*[Ac?max -  Actei (?)], (net6j (t + 1) > 0) 
Acte/ ( t ) » ( l - 0 ) +  nete (t + \)»[Actej (? )-Act^n],(netei(? + !)<0)
(2 . 10)
(2 .11)
The absolute value of the difference of the net input at loop t+1 and t is:
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D(t + l t )  = \H(t + l ) - H ( t ) \  (2.12)
If D (t +1, t) is greater than the specified harmony value, the procedure will repeat 
from (2.7) until the final difference is less than the harmony value. We can name it 
“Coherence Calculation” for the above UECHO’s working mechanism in order to 
make reference to it later.
Thagard further added the factor “Valence” to form the H0TC02. Valence 
referred to the subjective judgements to some propositions. That is to say, a 
proposition in his new emotion model will be influenced by both the cognition and the 
affect. As a result (2.9) is changed as follows:
netei (f +1) = X  L W (eu ) V +!) Actj + X  L W (eu } ( t + 1) • ActJ ̂  (t + 1)
i i
(2.13)
The valence of the node et is Vt and is updated the same as in (2.10).
Even though the addition of the factor valence could better simulate people’s 
emotional thinking manner, Thagard himself realized the valence based approach was 
unable to simulate a variety of emotions (Thagard 2003). This is the same 
conclusion Lerner and Keltner arrived at that we mentioned earlier (Lemer and 
Keltner 2000).
Many other ideas were also used as criteria towards making decisions, such as 
maximizing the pleasure and minimizing the pain (Tomkins 1984, McCauley and 
Franklin 1998, Mellers 2004), satisfying the motivation in the maximum level 
(Frijda 1986, Canamero 1997, Canamero 2003, Frijda 2004), and non-linear
probability weighting (see discussion in Loewenstein G. and Lerner 2003, p624 in
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Handbook o f  Affective Science) that mainly argues people do not always consider the 
option with the most occurring probability, but sometimes consider some options 
which happen less frequently.
Summary of Literature Review
In this chapter an overview on emotion research was provided. Two main concerns 
were addressed: the first was a brief overview on the development of the emotion 
research in the past decades and the second was a review on the theories of how to 
implement a complete emotion model.
Regarding the development of emotion research, the section first discussed 
whether emotion theories could bring new meanings to intelligence, AI in particular, 
since arguments around this issue have been happening for decades. We then did a 
brief review of the achievements made thus far according to different research 
motivations.
The section detailing the theoretical overview introduced various scholars’ 
interpretations to each key sub-course of a complete emotion process so we can obtain 
a broad enough overview for further modelling works.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Methodology
In this chapter, agent architecture with emotion support will be proposed first within 
the framework suggested by Sloman (Sloman 2001). The purpose of building such 
an emotional agent originates from two motivations: one is to test if emotional agents 
would be preferred by most of the game players over emotionless ones; the other is to 
test my hypothesis that the integration of beliefs as long term emotions could lead to 
more coherent behaviours for agents. We will then present the experiment design in 
order to test the above two hypotheses under my proposed agent architecture.
The design features a new way to interpret how emotions affect human decisions. 
The decision making process is not only affected by the current formed emotional 
state, but also determined by the action readiness which has the potential to evolve as 
the experience increases. This design is originally inspired by Damasio’s “Somatic 
Markers Hypothesis” (Damasio 1994, introduced in the first chapter) and Frijda’s 
“motivation” idea (Frijda 2004, see the literature review), but realized by using 
Belavkin’s conflict resolution formulas (Belavkin 2003, see my literature review). 
Instead of adopting the valence based approach, like Lerner (Lerner and Keltner 
2000, see my literature review), three primary emotions with their own characteristics 
were chosen to embody different emotion effects to the motion system. Another 
highlight of this research is considering belief as one more critical factor to emotion 
modelling, and as Frijda has suggested, this enables the agent to make decisions 
coherent to both the current emotional state and the past formed belief (Frijda et al. 
2000, see literature review).
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Expected Results
The research was based on the game Quake2, a first perspective shooting game under 
PC, which features furious battle scenarios and requires the subjects to make fast 
responses. The task of Quake2 within my thesis is simple: subjects only need to find 
and eliminate their opponent in one game map that synthesizes different landscapes. 
The fast response requirement and simple task setting are expected to reduce the 
degree of the human player’s deliberation, which also eliminates the need of an 
elaborate deliberation process for robots. Indeed, such a simple game environment is 
more obvious for game players to recognize any potential transition between emotions 
through the robot’s actions.
Grounded in the above settings, the research expects that the agent equipped with 
emotion components is able to make coherent responses to subjects’ challenges. 
That is to say, its behaviours and strategies are expected to be coherent to both of the 
long-term and short-term stimuli it has received. For instance, if it is experiencing 
more loss than gain (long term stimuli) or if it is heavily injured in a fight (short term 
stimuli), it is expected to act conservatively with less consideration on attacking and 
more on dodging or retreating. In the reverse situation, it is anticipated to behave 
aggressively. Such simulation may break a new path on how to design agents 
behaving coherently according to their own experience, w hich w ould fit people’s 
thinking manner while receiving little research interest from my investigation. 
Therefore, such emotional agents are also expected to have a much better 
performance than the regular emotionless agents.
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Starting with Rule Based System
We start with a simple model to build an emotional agent. In the gaming industry, 
more and more concern is focused on how to make game characters think and behave 
more like humans. This is because hard wired robots are not able to persist in 
human players’ enthusiasm beyond the point when humans get familiar with all the 
scenarios, potential rules, and/or the agents’ behaviour styles in a game.
Traditionally, adopting a rule based system is one economic and fast way to build 
agent architectures for games (another option considered is to use the finite state 
machine), as it is able to provide quick retrieving ability that finds an existing solution 
for agents to perform and it is also easily extendible to add more knowledge for 
agents if needed. Normally, a rule based system works as follows:
1. Certain situation is encountered;
2. Start retrieving the relevant rule chunks for seeking matched conditions from 
the rule base;
3. a) If only one rule is found, perform the actions or solutions corresponding to 
the condition.
b) If more than one rule satisfies the current condition, only the one placed in 
the preceding position will be chosen and the actions it includes will be executed.
c) If no matched condition is found, no action w ill be triggered.
It is easy to tell that such a simple mechanism can only produce monotonous 
results. For example, we set a rule in Quake2 to deal with the situation that when the 
agent finds itself in low health condition, it should choose to escape. As a result, a
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human may deduce reversely from the robot’s escape that it must be easily defeated in 
its low health condition. Such an “honest” opponent, which always faultlessly 
exposes its intent to its opponent (the escape behaviour always informs the opponent 
that it is too weak to fight: “Well, I am now too weak and close to death as there are 
not many health points left, just come and kill me”), would make its opponent humans 
bored after a while. To view the problem from another perspective, we may realize 
that such simple mapping may not cover all the reasons which could cause the escape, 
that is, the robot may retreat because of its low confidence in fighting ability, or just 
as a trick to tempt humans to attack and try to kill the opponent. On the other hand, a 
low health condition does not mean always choosing to escape, maybe a better 
solution exists such that the agent may go for the health bonus offered, and fight 
against its opponent after refilling itself with health points (HP), or just fight 
desperately. Generally, a simple rule based system binds a condition tightly with an 
action or a solution. It is impossible to map multiple conditions to multiple actions 
unless all combinations of both two sets are specified (See figure 3.1 below).
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Condition Alternative Actions
Flee
Low confidence to battle
Low health condition
Fetch Health Items near around
A luring trick
Fight desperately
Figure 3.1: A Typical Case in Rule Based System. Solid arrow represents an existing 
rule, and the dashed arrows represent other possible rules that could be added.
Implementing emotion theory could be a good choice to add diversity to the rule 
selection of agents. As the first chapter introduced, people’s decision making 
processes were intertwined with emotions, and the latter was important to the former. 
Consequently, incorporating emotional processes will greatly increase the flexibility 
during the rule selection process, and furthermore, it would also be possible to enable 
robots to think and behave like humans.
Still following the instance enumerated previously, by adopting the emotion
theory, what could be specified is only a more common condition, like “enemy seen”,
and then all the optional actions above could be included under the same premise.
The agent can then use its current emotional state as criteria to make its subsequent
selection. The selection process is correlated to the agent’s current emotional state
instead of a clearly defined condition: if the agent feels fearful even in a satisfactory
health condition, it will still choose to escape; on the contrary, if it becomes infuriated,
it probably chooses to fight to death and does not care much about its current health
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
condition (these two assumptions are in accordance with the average person’s manner 
of thinking). Therefore, running emotion theory to make selection to the above rule
sets would proceed as follows:
1. Certain situation is encountered;
2. Obtain the current emotional state.
3. a) Retrieve the relevant chunk of rule sets, and find one to best match current
emotional state.




Fetch Health Items near around
Flee
Fight to death
Figure 3.2: Using Emotions to Make Choice on Actions.
Compared to the regular rule based system, the above system with emotion
consideration could save the space of storing rules. For example, the regular system
needs to specify five rules to represent the scenario of “enemy seen”, while the latter
system only needs three.
Although the above example could be evidence that emotion theory could
improve the selection ability for rule based systems, it is far from constructing an
62
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emotional agent. The above selection process can only be thought of as the final 
decision signal coming out from the agent’s mind, but what the agent’s mind will be 
and how the decision is made are kept unknown. Therefore, in the next section, my 
implementation details based on Sloman’s three layers will be elucidated.
Implementation under Sloman’s Three Layers 
Mind Architecture
As mentioned in the literature review, Sloman’s Three Layers Mind architecture could 
be regarded as an ideal framework for extension. It hypothesized the most necessary 
structures in an adult’s mind, the three layers mind architecture, but left abundant 
space to allow more specific emotion theories to customize features in 
domain-dependant environments. In this section, I will illustrate how to build an 
emotional robot according to Sloman’s three layers mind architecture but with several 
improvements.
Modifications to Game Quake2
Since Quake2 has its own characteristics as a game and I have my own research 
emphasis, it is not possible to implement Sloman’s three layers mind architecture 
without any modifications. I will list all the differences between my design and 
Sloman’s architecture followed by a brief explanation, and most of the differences 
will be explained in detail in the subsequent sections.
The following places are tailored from Sloman’s theory to fit the game Quake2:
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The first is that the Deliberation Layer was designed to only handle deciding. 
The other deliberation processes such as planning or reasoning will be ignored as the 
nature of Quake2 determines.
Within my research context Quake2 is a first perspective shooting game that 
requires fast responses in real time and less deliberation process. Such a process, 
interpreted by LeDoux’s brain pathway theory, may mostly occur in the path 
involving basic emotions, and few through the path involving the secondary emotions. 
Such processes are characterises of many trivial and immense changes in the 
meantime. For example, we may not expect robots to pay much attention to human 
behaviours’ performance sequence during fighting in order to conduct a learning 
process, as even eight basic behaviours1 in Quake2 could produce millions of 
combinations (such as jumping first, aiming to the enemy, then finally firing; or left 
moving first, then,ducking, and finally turning away). It is not necessary to guess 
where the human player will go to next from its current walking route, as the map is 
large and human players are not in grids. The above processes may appear either too 
random to happen, or too trivial to be “marked” by secondary emotions (as Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis suggested), therefore building HMM or finite state machines to do 
some estimation job for deliberation may consume much computing resource which is 
highly restricted during the game playing. Instead, to let an agent evaluate its 
fighting performance seems more meaningful, and I will explain later how to carry it 
out using Damasio’s Somatic Markers Hypothesis in the deliberation process
1 Eight basic behaviours in Quake2 include Step forward, Step backward, Move left, Move right, 
Jump, Duck, Turn around and Fire.
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combined with my conjecture.
The second is that only Fear, Happiness and Anger were chosen from the six 
primary emotions proposed by Ekman (Ekman 1992) mentioned in the literature 
review. The reasons are identical to what Gadanho and Hallam (2001) explained 
that some primary emotions were probably not useful to be implemented in a certain 
experiment environment. Under the game Quake2, the emotion Disgust could not be 
used as there was no such situation for the agent to feel disgust unless we add some 
toxic food or other settings; the emotion Surprise could be felt by the agent when it 
accidentally met the human player or some other items, but there was no appropriate 
action in the reactive layer for it to perform for those scenarios; the emotion Sadness 
could also be felt but the actions for it could be highly overlapping to those for Fear. 
Therefore, choosing Fear, Happiness and Anger from the 6 emotions were believed 
enough to empower an agent to express its behaviours in different emotional ways.
On the other side, I do not support the popular point of view in computer science 
that oversimplifies emotions into two valence based groups according to their effects, 
positive effect or negative effect. A counterexample is Surprise, which may lead to 
either positive effects or negative effects, and more evidence can be found in the 
literature review.
The third is the information flow, based on Sloman’s alarm mechanism, and will 
be simplified to hard wired events and behaviours for different upper layers; those of 
the Deliberation layer and Meta-Management layer, as he did not derive any specific 
mechanism to distinguish stimuli or outputs from “Mind” for different layers,
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although he suggested setting attention filters in each layer and combining them with 
his alert system to form some information flow. The implementation process will be 
illustrated in the next section.
Reactive Layer
Under Sloman’s agent architecture, it is easy to tell how the rule based system could 
serve as the reactive system of his designed three layer architecture. Since it is 
responsible for receiving emotional signals from the upper layer, and deliver it to 
trigger appropriate decisions or behaviours, how to implement it properly becomes the 
main issue. Damasio suggests (page 196-198, Damasio 1994) that only enough 
“factual knowledge” provided could drive the Somatic Markers to make effective 
judgements or selections. Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) further pointed out such 
knowledge should be complete and accurate. Plus, Damasio suggests the knowledge 
should also be categorized prior to use, as “...prior categorization allows us to 
discover rapidly whether a given option or outcome is likely to be advantageous, or 
how diverse contingencies can modify the degree of advantage”. Within my 
implementation on the game Quake2, such knowledge was presented as symbols in a 
conventional way to guide robots to perform various tasks such as fight, pursuit, 
escape, seeking items, and wandering, to name a few. And those symbols were 
carefully layered depending on their abstractness degree and were also categorized 
under their concerned themes. For example, “flee” could be thought of as a more 
abstract concept to “jump”; and “Jump Fire”, “Forward Fire”, “Dodge Fire” could be
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under the same theme “chunk.Fight”. These themes were layered into three, each of 
which contained a few themes, and each theme included none, one, or more symbols 
which could be thought of as atomic behaviours; if the theme did not contain any 
symbols, itself would be thought as an atomic behaviour. Although it was a manual 
job to classify symbols and layered the themes, it explicitly carried out Sloman’s 
proposition about layering behaviours or decisions to reflect different emotional 
influences as introduced in the last section. The following map illustrates my 
design:
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Figure 3.3: Inside the Rule Based System. A solid  arrow denotes a possible route
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derived from  a symbol represented by a square when satisfying some condition; the 
dashed arrow denotes one continuous task that will be triggered from  the source symbol 
since the next round in the rule based system, and the task w ill be represented by 
“Chunk.preTask”.
The above figure presented provides us with a rough impression of how the rule 
based system works: it takes in the emotion signal as the criteria to make a choice or 
decision, and makes three different choices in three layers. The choice from the 
upper layer represents some abstract decision (such as escape or pursuit), while the 
lower layer contains a more concrete choice on how to execute the abstract idea 
selected from the upper layer coherently. To make the working mechanism clear, it is 
better to provide an example for illustration: initially, suppose the agent now is very 
angry and also under a low-health condition due to many previous battles lost, it starts 
its selection from the layer 1, which loads some general options: “Chunk.preTask”, 
“Chunk.sensing”, and “Chunk.tactic”. The first option “Chunk.preTask” normally is 
used to perform some continuous tasks that cannot be done in a single loop, e.g. 
Escape (“flee”) or Pursuit and so on. The second option “Chunk.sensing” suggests 
to the robot to perceive, and the last option “Chunk.tactic” enables the robot to start 
deliberation regardless of the current situation. Its anger cannot make it keep 
executing the current continuous task “seek some health item” to remedy itself, so it 
simply disrupts it, and it finds itself too upset to sense anything around it, which 
makes it impossible to choose the “Chunk.sensing”. As a result, it chooses 
“Chunk.tactic” to make a further selection. In “Chunk.tactic”, there are an additional 
three options for choosing: “Seek Enemy”, “Flee” and “Chunk.Fight”. Again, it
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chooses “Seek Enemy” to match its current emotional state as it does not see the 
enemy yet, or it would choose “Chunk.Fight” otherwise. And it also registers the 
current strategy “Seek Enemy” for “Chunk.preTask” for the next loop. In the third 
layer, it chooses “Chunk.move” and makes further selection “Move Forward” to make 
its hunting process contiune. In the next loop, if it sees the enemy, or if its emotional 
state changes to less angry (maybe it accidentally obtains a health bonus to refill its 
health point), it will again disrupt its current continuous task “Seek Enemy” to 
“Wander” or anything else to best match its current emotional state.
From the above description, some advantages are worth discussing: the rule based 
system builds up a flexible mechanism for making decisions. As mentioned before, 
instead of making decisions completely depending on the current situation, the 
mechanism allows the agent to make choices according to its current emotional state. 
Furthermore, if one notices the words “very angry” or “less angry” used in the above 
paragraph, he or she may be aware of how to make those terms perceptible to the 
robot. As mentioned in the literature review, emotion researchers normally assigned 
the values to each emotion to denote its intensity, and the one with maximum value 
will obtain the power to represent the agent’s current emotional state and be 
considered in the following decision making process (Velasquez 1997, Gadanho and 
Hallam 2001 mentioned in my literature review). This winner-takes-all strategy 
seems less rational, for example, calling an emotional state “Fear” as it is composed 
of 50% fear, 49% anger and 1% happiness. The so-called “Fear” is far cry from the 
emotional state 90% fear, 9% anger and 1 % happiness as the former one should have
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much more violent intentions to choose more aggressive task than the latter. In my 
implementation, the selection process appears to be more “smooth” as it is able to 
distinguish the “very angry” and “less angry” states. Another main highlight of my 
adoption is to make decisions to best match the agent’s current emotional state, rather 
than making selections to best match current dominant emotion or to seek maximum 
pleasure (see my literature review). Although those features are embodied in the 
reactive layer, the actual decision has already been made from its upper layer, the 
deliberative layer. I will illustrate how to implement the above advantages in the next 
main section, the deliberative layer.
Deliberative Layer
According to Sloman’s description, (as was mentioned in the literature review), the 
deliberative layer holds many intelligent components such as reasoning, planning and 
deciding that sufficiently distinguish humans from most of the other creatures on the 
Earth. As explained in the “Modifications to Game Quake2”, we may temporarily set 
aside those parts of intelligence other than decision within the context of my thesis. 
As mentioned earlier, the deliberative layer is capable of managing basic rules in the 
reactive layer and without its support, we or any other intelligent creatures may 
require more memory space to remember all possible combinations between 
conditions and actions. Such characteristics of the deliberative layer were actually 
demonstrated by the ways of emotional selections in the previous main section 
“Starting with a Rule Based System”. How can we make such an emotional selection
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process work rationally like humans do? This is something which is going to be 
explained in this next sub section.
According to my design, this layer consists of two major systems that lead to 
human-like decision making process: One is the emotion elicitation system and the 
other is the action readiness system. A brief illustration of the general working 
mechanism in the deliberative layer will first be presented, and then it will be 
followed by the illustrations on those two sub systems separately. Lastly, an issue 
will be discussed on why the synthesized emotional signals from the two sub systems 
would generate human like decisions or behaviours for the reactive layer.
Regular Working Mechanism in the Deliberative Layer
To give an intuitive impression on what the deliberative layer is and how it is related 
to the reactive layer, the structure for those two layers is presented as below:
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Event Perception System





(Long term effect from Meta-Management Layer)
Stimuli Emotion
System
Elicitation Action Readiness System
FS,SS,
FA,SA
Deliberative Layer Emotion Signal
Reactb e Layer
Action result to 
the outer world
Figure 3.4: Reactive Layer and Deliberative Layer. The figure clearly marks the 
position o f  the deliberative layer in the entire agent architecture, its composition, and 
its interactions between its upper and lower layers. The dashed separating line within 
the box o f  event perception system denotes the division o f  the perceived events.
The above figure clearly marks the interactions between the reactive layer and the 
deliberative layer.
Before introducing the entire working procedure of the deliberative layer, it is 
necessary to mention how to categorize events perceived from the outer world that
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could be the agent’s perceptions. As mentioned in the literature review of Sloman’s 
mind architecture, the perception should be divided into three levels according to the 
degree of sophistication. Here within the context of Quake2, the sophistication degree 
of perception was dependent upon the significance of the perceived event. That is to 
say, the events that result in great emotional changes were perceived as high degree 
perceptions; and the events with no emotional changes were automatically dealt with 
by the Quake2 game engine and thus lead to no perceptions within the agent 
architecture. These events belonging to none of the above two cases were perceived as 
low level perceptions.
Since the main goal of the game Quake2 is to earn the highest score possible, all 
the events related to the scores were set in my implementation to bring about the 
greatest emotional changes. As a result, they were perceived as high degree 
perceptions by the agent. Those events included the HScore (the Human won Score 
last time), the RScore (the Robot won Score last time), the HEsc (the Human made 
Escape last time), and the REsc (the Robot made Escape last time). Since they 
occurred at a low frequency, they were called “long term interval events”. The 
perceived result was processed in both the deliberative layer and the 
meta-management layer, which also agreed with the findings mentioned in the 
literature review.
Some occurrences from the events are not related to the score but still lead to 
slight emotional changes. They therefore, were perceived as middle degree 
perceptions. Those events include SS (Successfully shot the opponent), FS (Failed
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shooting the opponent), SA (Successfully avoided the opponent’s bullet), and FA 
(Failed to avoid the opponent’s bullets). The above events will be evaluated during the 
fighting scenarios. They are called “short term events” due to their relatively short 
duration and high frequency of occurrence.
The other events, such as perceiving the walls and landscapes, are not related to 
any emotions, and consequently do not induce any level of perception.
The rest of this section will give a brief introduction on the working procedure of 
the deliberative layer.
Events are first perceived from the outer world by the agent and then the 
perceived result is delivered to the deliberative layer or higher.
When the appraisal result enters the deliberative layer, it will be handled 
concurrently by both the Emotion Elicitation System and the Action Readiness 
System. The above two systems in the deliberative layer, along with signals from the 
Meta-Management or higher layer, will be synthesized to generate emotional signals 
that guide the reactive layer to perform the appropriate behaviours. If the event is a 
long term interval event, the deliberative layer will feedback its current emotional 
state along with long term interval events, to its upper meta-management layer to then 
be dealt with. Detail process will be illustrated in the next section titled the 
“Meta-Management Layer”.
After executing a decision, the result will be acted out in the exterior world. This 
may induce another event in the external world, and if this event can be perceived by 
the agent next time, the procedure will repeat from the start of the working procedure.
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Emotion Elicitation System
The Emotion Elicitation System takes in any event perceived outside the mind 
architecture and produces coherent emotional states. In the context of Quake2, the 
conditions of eliciting or updating emotions will be first explained, and then the 
design of the emotion elicitation system will be introduced, a design based on the 
connectionist network UECHO. Last of all, an improvement on UECHO, one that can 
better embody diverse emotional responses to the same stimulus, will be presented.
Two Types of Elicitations
In the literature review, four types of elicitations were discussed. To allow for 
generality, only two types of the four were taken into account for the game Quake2. 
One is the elicitation by cognition appraisal which follows Frijda’s suggestion 
mentioned in the literature review, but with a slight revision. For instance, an 
emotion is elicited by a cognition appraisal outcome of external events, and the events 
are linked to only three different specific emotions as opposed to positive or negative 
emotions. These emotions are fear, happiness and anger. There are two types of 
scenarios we will explore in Quake 2. One is the battle scenario whereby an enemy 
is seen by the agent. The other is the normal scenario whereby no enemy is 
perceived. Regarding concerns mentioned in Frijda’s narration, the three above 
emotions, become wired with one concern object, in each type of appraisal scenario. 
In the first scenario, four events “FS”, “SS”, “FA” and “SA” may be perceived and 
may elicit the corresponding emotions according to the concern object A H P , “delta of
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health points”. Also, if long term interval events such as HScore, RScore, HEsc or 
REsc, are perceived, they will elicit emotions in the second scenario. That is, 
emotions will be elicited in both the deliberative and the meta-management layers, 
which is in conjunction with Sloman’s “ 0 ” conjecture mentioned previously, only 
with the different concern object A Score, “delta of the score”. How to calculate the 
emotion intensity according to the above two concern objects will soon be explained 
later in this section.
The other elicitation occurs when a past memory is recalled just as Ekman 
suggested as seen within the literature review. For example, one may recall a part or 
a complete scene from a past memory and thus elicit some emotion. Within the 
context of Quake2, such a process is implemented through the beliefs that reside in 
the meta-management layer. Each time events are dealt with by the deliberative and or 
meta-management layers, the deliberative layer will incorporate the anticipatory 
emotional signals produced by beliefs from the meta-management layer and thus 
produce the ultimate emotional signal. The next main section, titled 
“Meta-Management Layer”, will elaborate on the process of generating anticipatory 
emotional signals.
Create Emotion Elicitation System as Connectionist Network
Building an emotion elicitation system by means of a connectionist network is not a 
new attempt, (Velasquez 1997, Bozinovski 1999, Gadanho and Hallam 2001). As
explained in the previous section, some external stimuli will be hardwired to elicit or
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
update emotions. Furthermore, in the next section, the “Meta-Management Layer”, 
it will become clear that long term interval effects from the upper layer can also exert 
their impact on the emotions. Yet, within the framework of this section, the focus is 
on how short term events influence emotions. To fit the settings in game Quake2, an 
emotion elicitation system is designed as followings:
SA HScore




Figure 3.5: The Connectionist Network inside Emotion Elicitation System. The solid  
lines between each two boxes indicates positive effects between them, while the dash 
lines represents negative effects between two emotions.
The above figure exhibits how to connect primary emotions to their relevant 
events by means of the connectionist network inside the emotion elicitation system. 
The first row displays three primary emotions which are in the position of proposition 
nodes. The second row is lined with evidence nodes which are the events perceived 
externally. Those events are the elicitors of the emotions in the first row. For example, 
all positive events can trigger happiness, and all negative events can trigger fear, as do
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most negative events plus HEsc (Human made escape before), while REsc triggers 
anger. Additionally, the dashed lines between two primary emotions indicate the 
opposing influences existing between them. This setting is a common conjecture in 
emotion research (Minsky 1986, Velasquez 1997).
In order to calculate emotion intensities, I have primarily adopted Velasquez’s 
formula as was mentioned in the literature review.
=x (3.1)
The explanation of the above formula can be referred to in the literature review.
Since the above formula has a highly overlapping form to the activation updating 
formulas 2.9 and 2.10 under UECHO (Wang 1998), and Velasquez did not increase 
implementation details in his own emotion models,(Velasquez 1997), I have placed
(3.1) under the framework of UECHO to obtain more extensibility for my own 
research. Another important reason to use the above transplant is because the 
Meta-Management layer requires the use of beliefs which are present in the UECHO 
mode. I will elaborate on this later.
Create Event Intensity for Emotion Elicitation System
Although UECHO ameliorated upon ECHO in many places, it is not sufficient to be 
directly used as an Emotion Elicitation System without modification. The main 
deficiency of UECHO is that it is unable to embody the individuality of each of the 
primary emotions. This was also the problem that Thagard’s H 0TC02 had. We find 
from the literature review that when two propositions are linked to the same evidence,
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UECHO only updated the activation value for a proposition through its old weight. As 
a result, two propositions in the above case always attained the same weight value 
because they received the same effect from the same event at all times.
For example, if “FS” is discovered, then the link between “FS” and “Anger” and 
the one between “FS” and “Fear” will both be updated. Normally, the ECHO or 
UECHO system will update the proposition “Fear” and “Anger” equally over their 
linking weights as well as their activation values. The issue is that we cannot always 
expect that Fear and Anger will attain the same activation updating value since that is 
unable to reflect the diversity of different emotions to the same stimulus. Instead, it is 
better to suppose that the emotional state is sometimes composed more of “anger” 
than “fear”, and other times, more of “fear” than “Anger”. In order to carry out the 
above effect, the concept of “event intensity” has been created. This represents the 
impact exerted by the perceived event on the agent’s current emotional state if the 
event relates to some concerned object that are pertinent to the emotion. As each 
emotion has its own feature set, they are expected to be influenced by the same event 
in different degrees.
As mentioned in the literature review, an emotion will be elicited in one of two 
ways, as mention earlier in this chapter, by the cognitive appraisal. The appraisal 
process is triggered when some concern is impinged on by the received stimuli. In the 
battle scenario, HP was wired to be the main object to be concerned with for all three 
of the emotions. To make such a concerned object computable by the event intensity, 
the HP was elaborated as AH P . That is,
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fjp  HP
^ f f p    agent________ opp
(3.2)
H Pm ax
In (3.2), HP  and HP  represent health points of the agent and its opponent 
respectively, both in [0, 100]. HPmm =100. AHP will consequently be in the range
Similarly, the concerned object, or “Scores between the agent and its human 
opponent”, was wired for the three primary emotions in the non-battle scenario. Again, 
A Score was used to compute the concern caused by long term interval events:
AScore —




Scoreagem -  Scoreopp <— Score„
Scoreagmt -  Scoreopp > Scoremax
Scoreagent -  Scoreopp < -S coremax
(3.3)
In (3.3), Score and Scoreopp represent the score the agent made and then that 
of the opponent respectively. Scoretrmh  10. AScore is bounded in [-1,1],
Indeed, (3.2) and (3.3) express people’s different concerns within their 
environments. In battle scenarios, people are mostly concerned with the condition of 
their health. So if “FA” occurs and people are in good health, they may not care 
much about the health loss from FA and in this case, the concern value caused by FA 
will be low, thus leading to a minor change in people’s emotional states. In contrast, 
someone with a FA occurring in low health may begin to panic. This type of 
consideration is regarded as the “alarm mechanisms” or “Urgency” within the 
mainstream of emotion modelling works, (Sloman 2001, Frijda 1986, Damasio 1994,
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Canamero 1997). Similarly, long term interval events may induce a similar change in 
people’s concern when in non-battle scenarios.
After assigning different concerns to different groups of events, we use the 
following formula to calculate the event intensity for a primary emotion et in a clear 
way:
y / \ . ek'Vc —vcim{ek ,e~k
Lvt (ei) =  s ig n ----------- ------ ---------
e —e
In (3.4), I evt ) denotes the intensity of an occurred event and the influence it 
has on a certain emotion et ; its value consistently falls within the range of [0, 1] 
which is determined by the right side of the equation;, sign indicates the valence of 
the event to a primary emotion. That is, some event may have a positive or a negative 
influence on a primary emotion, FA is negative to happiness for example, k is a 
scaling parameter within the range of [-1, 1], and the less the absolute value of k is,
the more drastic the change I evt can make. K  is the value of the current concern 
and can be either AHP or A Score.
Within the emotion elicitation system, one presumption was made that only one of 
the three primary emotions was most positively influenced by a certain event in (3.4), 
while the other two primary emotions were less sensitive to the event. Such an 
assumption enabled one emotion in a certain event to hold the higher potential to 
change activities to better satisfy the emotion. Such mechanism allowed competition 
opportunity for other emotions. For instance, fear was set to be the most sensitive and 
positive emotion to the event “FA”. During a “Chunk Fight” battle, the emotion of
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fear increased in an agent that had been shot more than once. The intensity of this 
emotion will increase much faster than the other two emotions and force the agent to 
retreat instead of continuing the fight. On the other hand, it is possible for the 
dominant emotion, say anger, to cause resistance to fear if its emotion intensity is high 
enough, or if it can obtain enough support from its positively linked event (FS linked 
to anger for example). Also, if the value of the concern ( AHP  or AScore ) is too large, 
which result in that the most felt emotion only receives a much smaller gain (see the 
formula 3.4 combined with the table 3.1), such a condition also make it possible for 
the dominant emotion to maintain its current leading position. The following table 
listed the scaling parameters used in Quake2 for each primary emotion under different 
events; they were chosen to reasonably match the above description:
FS SS FA SA
Fear +  , -1.0 - , - 3 .0 f-0.1(AKP>0) 
+ ,[0.1 (AHP< 0)
- ,-3 .0
Happiness - , - 3 .0 f-0.1(AHP>0) 
+’|0.1 (AHP< 0)
- ,  -3.0 J-0.4 (AH P>0) 
+’ [0.4 (AHP < 0)
Anger [-0.2 (AHP > 0) 
+’ |0.2 (AHP<0)
- , - 3 .0 +  ,-0.5 - ,-3 .0
Table 3.1 Scaling Param eter Table fo r  Event Intensity under Short Term Effect
In the above table, the one with two conditional values is the mainly positively
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affected emotion.
Similar to the cable 3.1, the following table displays the scaling parameter setting 
for events related to the object" A Score”.
RScore HScore REsc HEsc
Fear - ,  -0.5 - ,  -0.5 f—0.1 (AScore > 0) 
+’ [0.1 (AScore <0)
- ,-3 .0
Happiness J-0.1 (AScore >0) 
’ [0.1 (AScore <0)
- , - 0 .5 - , - 1 .0 J-0.1 (AScore >0) 
+’ [0.1 (ASbore<0)
Anger - , - 1 .0 f-0.1 (AScore >0) 
[0.1 (ASbore<0)
+  , -0.5 - ,-3 .0
Table 3.2 Scaling Param eter Table fo r  Event Intensity under Long Term Effect
After obtaining the event intensity, we can update an emotional state by updating 
the linking weight of each primary emotion in the connectionist network. Then we 
can re-calculate the activation value of the emotion (the new emotion value) 
according to their updated weight.
The weight updating formula is changed from
fce(A ctnrdy + 1 (P U i)•« -  A ctpu )*Actev (evk and P U i positively linked) 
A w (ev .,P U 3  =  \ k ' ‘
\-a * {A c tPUj + f ,vlt (P U i )•« -  Actmm >A cteVi {evk and P U : negatively linked)
(3.5)
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The above formula, Aw(evk,P U )) denotes the linking weight update between 
Aemotion e{ and its supporter, event evtk . The right side of the formula is mainly 
based on Wang’s weight updating formula (2.7), but with one revision. The 
component event intensity I evtk (£ ,)• // was added in order to solve the deficiency 
mentioned in the beginning of this section; / /  is the maximum effect of event 
intensity and is given the value of 0.2.
If we replace (2.7) with (3.5) in the last section, and follow the coherence 
calculation process introduced in the literature review, we can obtain the entire 
working mechanism inside the Emotion Elicitation System. Such a working 
mechanism is called the “revised coherence calculation” and will be needed for later 
reference.
Action Readiness System
If we only use the current emotional state obtained from the emotion elicitation 
system to affect the agent’s action, it seems in vain. That is, we still do not know why 
one emotion will trigger a certain action, nor do we know what the mapping 
relationship is between emotion and action. The Action Readiness System is applied 
as a crucial bridge that connects emotions to actions and results in rational “emotional 
actions”. This is how the mapping relationship can be understood, (the second 
question above. The adaptability of this system, fits with Damasio’s Somatic Markers 
Hypothesis, and thus answers the first question.
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Connect Primary Emotions to Symbols in Rule Based System
As mentioned in the literature review, (Lerner and Keltner 2000) once suggested 
that each emotion (at least among basic emotions) has its own distinct judgement or 
effect to the same event or object. They used the emotion of anger to exemplify this 
fact, (Lerner and Keltner 2001) and their theory is what inspired me to use Fear, 
Happiness and Anger as the three primary emotions in my research.
Furthermore, in order to offer a general yet accurate description of these emotions, 
it is necessary to explore evidence from within research works from the field of 
Psychology. Consequently, by synthesizing the opinions of a few psychologists 
within the content of this thesis, (Lerner and Keltner 2000, Lerner and Tiedens 
2006, Mellers 2004, Isen 1993, Isen 2004), I have come to the conclusion that Fear is 
emoted as a pessimistic attitude in combat and results in risk aversion strategies or 
behaviours. On the contrary, the emotion of anger results in an optimistic attitude 
about the future and produces attacking strategies by dominating over other emotions 
such as the need to escape. Happiness on the other hand always produces rational 
and optimistic decisions that are always positive. For example, it may not produce 
the same sort of results for escape as fear but it may instigate an attack if it is 
constantly influenced by positive events.
By following Frijda’s emotion theory mentioned in the literature review, we can 
further extract three motivations respectively for the primary emotions. Therefore, 
Risk aversion can be the motivation for Fear while escape is the end result. Self 
improvement is the result of happiness, and assault is the end result of anger. In this
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context, self improvement implies anything which results in improved conditions for 
the agent such as score gaining, health point refilling or armour equipping.
We can assume that one emotion does not only respond to its own motivation, but 
it also responds to the other motivations of the other two emotions. This enables 
competition between emotions during the decision making process, and is consistent 
with the connectionist network in the last section. The following table reflects this 
assumption:
Risk Aversion Self Improvement Assault
Fear +  + + —
Happiness — + +
Anger — — +  +
Table 3.3: M otivations to Emotions. “ ~h” refers to the supportive attitude one 
emotion has to a motivation, “ —” to averse attitude.
Since motivation, as mentioned before, acts as the bridge connecting emotion and 
symbols in a rule based system, it is required that it too can specify the relationship 
between motivations and symbols. If we consider the effect a certain symbol can 
produce, we can easily construct the following table to reflect the relationship 
between motivations and symbols:







Chunk.Tactic + NULL + 0.25,0,0.25
Chunk.Sensing
NULL + NULL 0.25,0.25,-0.25
Chunk.Fight
-- -- + -1,0.25,1
Flee + NULL — 0.75,-0.5,-0.75
Pursue — NULL + -0.75,0.5,0.75
Wander NULL NULL NULL 0,0,0
Seek Items NULL + NULL 0.25,0.25,-0.25
Seek Enemy — NULL + -0.75,0.5,0.75
Table 3.4: Part o f  Symbols in Rule Based System to Motivations. “N U LL” in the table 
refers to no effect between a symbol and a certain motivation
Notice the last row in the above table. One column among the vectors denotes a 
finally formed action readiness for a symbol, which is obtained by the product 
between the matrix of table 3.3 and the matrix formed by the first three rows of the 
table 3.4. We can express this mathematically as follows:
Vecmxk = [Emotionm,M otivationn ]7 X[Motivationn,Sym bolk ] (3.6)
The above formula represents the action readiness of emotion “m” to symbol “k” 
bridged by motivation “n”. During the above calculation, the “ + ” is assigned the
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value of 1, 1, “ +  + ” 2, “------” -2, “NULL” 0. All the vectors in table 3.4 have
been normalized by the base 4.
One thing to be aware of is that not every symbol in the rule based system is 
assigned an action readiness value; in that not all actions need to be elicited by 
emotions (Frijda 2004). Two examples of this is “Wander” in table 3.4, or “Move 
Forward” which is not displayed in the table. The symbols under the theme 
“Chunk.Fight” were not given any action readiness value, either. The reason for this is 
that I will be demonstrating how action readiness can be adapted constantly under 
Damasio’s Somatic Markers Hypothesis (Damasio 1994), in the next chapter.
Demonstration on the Adaptability of Action Readiness by 
Somatic Markers Hypothesis
In this last section, the basic knowledge of initial action readiness for every symbol 
within a rule based system is presented. Thereby, the agent can use the settings to 
produce emotional decisions. One main question that transpires is what if the agent 
has no prior emotional experience in relation to an action or theme? One possible 
answer lies in using the Somatic Markers Hypothesis, (Damasio 1994, see chapter 1 
of my thesis for details) to make adaptive updating on the action readiness along the 
accumulation of the experience. Since the setting in table 3.3 represents the nature of 
those three primary emotions, we may keep it fixed; while the one in table 3.4 could 
be revisable as it represents the attitudes of emotions to symbols. Such attitudes 
could be constantly updated because the feedback from executing a certain symbol
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changes or diversifies over time. As mentioned in the last section, I will begin my 
examination for such adaptability by looking at the Somatic Markers Hypothesis and 
the theme “Chunk Fight”.
The process of updating the action readiness is actually the one to update the 
three emotions’ attitudes towards one action. Since each emotion has different 
motivations in choosing actions, it can be assumed that one specific emotion is most 
inclined or predisposed to the action that most satisfies the motivation. This was 
also Frijda’s viewpoint mentioned in the literature review. This was best seen in the 
theme “Chunk.Fight”. We saw the performance of “Dodge” for risk aversion and 
“Hit” for assault, while self improvement was sensitive to any positive outcome 
produced by “Dodge” and “Hit” as they can trigger the emotion happiness.
Given the above motivation settings, we may further apply Belavkin’s conflict 
resolution approach to calculate the action readiness for each option under the theme 
“Chunk.Fight”. That is, the determined cost for each motivation is first calculated, and 
then its reciprocal form is accepted as the action readiness. The meaning behind the 
above procedure is interpretable as follows: the smaller the expected cost to satisfy
one motivation is, the more solid the link between the motivation and the action will 
be. This correlates with the right maps in Frijda’s description on motivation in the 
literature review whereby the motivation could “potentiate the action disposition 
(action readiness)” because of “previous experience”.
For “dodge”, the effort is the number of times the opponent is hit, while success 
is the number of accomplished dodges. Similarly, for “attack”, the ratio is the
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number of missed target shoots relative to the number of hits on the target. To enable
the outcomes from “dodge” and “assault” in a comparable amount level, dodge is 
given one point of value for every fifteen successful dodges made. This is because 
to dodge is much simpler that to accomplish a successful assault. For happiness, 
things have been done differently as it is affected by both the positive events and 
outcomes, and costs of the above two categories. The action readiness value of 
happiness will be the midpoint or median in between the two other values for 
motivations. The following formulas show the attitude updating for three motivations 
respectively:
In the above formulas, the “w” with the value of 15, is the regulation parameter to 
enable the action readiness value from “dodge” to be comparable with one from 
“attack” as mentioned previously. By synthesizing the matrix calculation (3.6) with 
table 3.3 which defines the attitudes of emotions to three motivations, and makes 
assumption that all the attitudes are originally set to be positive “+ ” (as all three 
attitudes from (3.7a) to (3.7c) produce positive values), we may derive three action 
readiness values for the three emotions, accordingly:
Attitude l)odJ x )  =
w x k pgdge(x) + l





k  Assault Assault (*) Assault ( X ) )
____________ W ><k Doctge ( X )  +  Assault 0 ) + l
(3.7b)
k Dodge W C o o d g e  ( X ) k Assault ( X ) C Assault W  Dodge ( X ^ ^ A s s a u lt (*)) 
(3.7c)
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ARFear (x) = 2x AttitudeDodge (x) + AttitudeSI (*) -  AttitudeAttack (x) (3.8a)
A R HaPPiness ( x )  =  ~ AttitudeDodge O) + AttitudeSI (x) + AttitudeAltack (x) (3.8b) 
ARA n g e r(x) = ~AttitudeDodge(x) ~ AttitudeS[ (*) + 2 x AttitudeAttack (x) (3.8c)
Among the above three formulas, AR represents “action readiness”.
Again, by following Belavkin’s conclusion mentioned in the literature review the 
regarding the optimum moment to give up the current trying solution, the above 
formulas could be used to determine when to give up. During the fighting process, it 
is certain that the probability of the potential first hit and first dodge from a hit will 
correspond to the Poisson distribution, therefore, I adopted his theory by using the 
reciprocal forms of (3.8a) through (3.8c) to guide the agent to redirects its actions 
when necessary. That is, if the number of hits an agent received from its opponent is 
beyond the expected times, or if the number of its failed attempts to shoot its 
opponent is more than the expected times, it may smartly know to switch from the 
current fighting actions to other options which may have better action readiness. 
Before switching, it will update the expected cost of the current action to a larger 
value which allows for greater failure tolerance at the expense of less opportunity to 
be chosen next time. The action readiness will be updated accordingly. On the 
contrary, if the attempts of one action always generate positive outcomes, (ie: the 
agent always hits the opponent and avoids attacks effectively), the expected cost to 
perform this action will be lower than before. This lower expected cost could most 
probably result in the agent failing to perform the action successfully. Nontheless, it 
is evident that after several attempts, the expected cost will inevitably reach a point of
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balance in that the action readiness will reflect a stable performance for the agent to 
choose
Since the above action readiness mechanism has been set up, we can now start to 
see how an emotion chooses action through commensurate action readiness. As 
mentioned before, the conventional approach is the use of the “winner-takes-all” 
mechanism, so that the dominant emotion which has the greatest emotion value over 
the other emotions will choose the action according to its characteristics. It is argued 
in the last section that such a mechanism may ignore the other emotions and their 
effects, although they may be less noticeable at some times over others, but not 
always. To extend Frijda’s idea (Frijda 2004) mentioned in the literature review, one 
certain emotion has a propensity to choose the action that most satisfies its motivation. 
We may think the agent will choose the action which best fits the current emotional 
state, instead of a single emotion. Such an extension could be represented by the 
following formula:
Action(x) =  2 A R emo,ionm ( X ) X V emotionm ( X )  (3.9)
arg max m -{tear,H appiness,A nger)
The above formula (3.9) embodies the action selection process in a mathematical 
way. That is, an emotional state will choose one action which has the maximum value 
from the summation of the products between one emotion’s intensity and its 
corresponding action readiness.
(3.9) explicitly points out that the action selection process is not determined by 
only one dominant emotion. Instead, it is codetermined by the current emotion
intensity and also by the related action readiness. (3.9) argues a decision making
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process does not only depend on the current emotional state, but also relies on the 
“impression” formed on each option. After many times of practice, certain opinions 
about certain objects or events will be gradually formed. For example, after thousands 
of attempts, the emotion “Fear” will finally discover that “forward&fire” is not 
suitable for it because it always leads to bad performance for “dodge”, the motivation 
most valued. As a result, when the robot is in a “mainly fearful” state, it chooses other 
appropriate actions such as “dodge&fire” rather than “forward&fire”. Furthermore, 
applying the above formula to action selection enables us to generate a more 
“smooth” effect, since it considers multiple emotional affects rather than one. Due 
to this fact, it can express some “fuzzy” and complex emotional actions. For example, 
if after a battle values have evolved as follows: “jump&fire” has the action readiness 
vector (0.80, 0.70, 0.10) and “forward&fire” equals (0.60, 0.55, 0.40); and the agent is 
mainly happy and only slightly angry at (0.00, 0.80, 0.20). This emotional order is 
“Fear, Happiness and Anger”. By working out the above settings through (3.9) we can 
obtain 0.58 for “jump&fire” and 0.52 for “forward&fire”, and it then becomes evident 
that the agent will choose “jump&fire”. If however, the agent is still happy but 
becomes more angry, say (0.00, 0.55, 0.45), we can again obtain 0.43 for “jump&fire” 
and 0.4825 for “forward&fire”; Within this scenario, the agent will now 
choose“forward&&fire”, in that the agent will prefer to attack than to dodge since 
anger results more in assault whereby the agent will exhibit more attacking intent. 
Consequently, we can discover that even under the same dominant emotional state 
such as happiness as cited in the above example, the agent may behave differently.
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This illustrates well that (3.9) has the ability to represent various “fuzzy” emotional 
states in contrast to the emotion signal from Mind architecture, which is not capable 
of such complexities if two or more emotional states share a dominant emotion.
It is time to turn back to see if the above mechanism reflects features in 
Damasio’s Somatic Markers Hypothesis (Damasio 1994). As I mentioned in the first 
chapter, the main feature of Somatic Markers Hypothesis is that those markers are 
able to highlight some options for us in the decision making process. Such ability is 
acquired due to the accumulation of experience from long term events. Still, 
Damasio only offered a vague description regarding how negative emotions can 
predict bad outcomes which act as an emotional “alarm”, and how positive emotions 
inspire a sense of optimism which offers hope and the ability to move foreward. The 
implementation in this research defines Somatic Markers in a more specific way. First, 
we admit that diversity existed in various emotions in that each emotion has its own 
distinct feature set. Corresponding to the first point, Somatic Markers need to imbue 
different emotions with their different attitudes to various objects or events in a 
specific domain. For example, in the research area of fighting explored in this thesis, 
such a process has already been implemented by using motivations as a crucial 
bridging factor to connect emotions to objects or events within a domain. By 
synthesizing the above two premises, an action readiness updating mechanism is built 
up which mimics the “highlight” process of Somatic Markers Hypothesis. An 
illustration of this is one certain emotion will eventually choose a certain action 
through experience; as an opinion to this action is eventually formed, it is marked
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according to the degree it satisfies the motivation. In other words, if the action 
always satisfies some motivation of the emotion well and successfully, then the 
emotion will score a high mark to this action in return. As a result, the emotion 
becomes inclined to choose that action when in the decision making process.
In order to make a clear idea of how to design the action readiness system, it is 
necessary to offer a generalized summary of the procedure as follows:
1. Build up the knowledge base specialized in the research domain (i.e. build up 
the “reactive layer”), as in this thesis the fighting knowledge was categorized 
under different themes in different abstract layers.
2. Seek evidence from psychological theory to form a description set for each 
emotion that could exert outstanding effect in the research domain. For 
instance, I applied fear, happiness and anger into fighting.
3. Specify the discriminating motivation for each emotion that could act as a 
bridge between emotions and various themes or symbols under them (Table 
3.3 for instance). Also specify the relationship between motivations and 
symbols or themes (Table 3.4 for example), and work out action readiness for 
each symbol through (3.8).
4. Calculate the emotional affect as illustrated through (3.9).
5. If the agent does not have any emotional experience but abundant options, it 
still gets the chance to be adaptive to the theme consisting of those options 
and it could gradually update its own action readiness according to the 
process introduced in this section. This idea fits well with Damasio’s
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Somatic Markers Hypothesis.
Meta-Management Layer
In this section, the problem will be proposed first in order to induce the necessity of 
introducing meta-management layer; then the reason to add belief in the layer will be 
explained; finally, the design for this layer will be presented.
Problem Identified without Meta-Management Layer
Although the two layers we have set up, the reactive layer and the deliberative layer, 
can produce various decisions in accordance with the agent’s current emotional state, 
the agent may still behave in a less human fashion. One main deficiency exists in that 
the robot may seem oblivious to all the scenarios it has experienced before and may 
be determined to continue challenging you no matter how many battles it has lost, (ie: 
10(human):0(robot)). On the other hand, it may always try to escape from you no 
matter how weakly you behave, (ie 0(human):10(robot)).
In this way, the agent has no sense of coherency or continuity with its past 
experiences. In order to rectify this situation, we can create two rules that will 
program the agent to make the correct response. First, if the you (the robot), has 
consecutively beaten your opponent more than five times, the robot should act more 
aggressively. On the contrary, if you (the robot) have continued to loose out to the 
opponent more than five times, you act less aggressively. If neither of the two 
scenarios exists, then you (the robot) should continue using your current strategies.
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It must be said however, that this simplicity is far from the complexity of human 
capability. People may start to behave aggressively after beating their opponent 
three times, ten times or even after they have lost the first round. In other words, the 
first example exhibits diverse behaviours people may choose and a set number or 
value is not representative of these differences. The second example demonstrates 
that past experiences can exert continuous effects on a person’s immediate decision 
and cannot be simulated by a set of rigid and inflexible rules.
Due to the above facts, it becomes necessary to add in another layer, the 
meta-management layer (Wright et al. 1996). This is placed on top of the agent 
brain architecture which is capable of producing long term signals in terms of past 
experiences. As a result, by synthesizing the signals from both the deliberative and 
meta-management layers, the final output from the agent’s mind to its motion system 
is believed to guide the agent to produce behaviours coherent to both its current 
emotional state and past experience.
Adding Beliefs into the Meta-Management Layer
The need to involve the meta-management layer in the agent’s mind architecture is to 
gain higher control or influence over the deliberative layer. This was suggested by 
(Wright et al. 1996, Sloman 1998) in the literature review. There are two main 
concepts involved in this layer. First, with it we can make evaluations or 
comparisons to the strategies or plans created in the deliberative layer, so that we can 
suggest that people make better choices in the future. Second, we are able to
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persistently offer a new viewpoint even if it is in contradiction with the one offered in 
the deliberative layer. Sloman thought there were some “tertiary emotions in the 
Meta-Management layer, such as infatuation, jealousy, grief or pride, that enabled 
people to ignore or reject something inconsistent with them. For example, people in 
group A who are jealous of those in group B will most likely not register the latter 
group’s achievements.
Tertiary emotions in the meta-management layer (Wright et al. 1996) were 
interpreted as being enduring, highly resistible and perturbing (referring to the ability 
to interrupt the current ongoing thinking process and take control). More specific to 
the problem raised previously, I will make use of the former two features of tertiary 
emotions to form “belief’, while the third feature of “perturbance” is actually partly 
implemented in the lower layer by the competition mechanism of UECHO, (i.e. one 
continuous task could be interrupted and switched to another due to a change in 
emotional state The difference is that “perturbance” may exert a sudden impact that 
forces the decision generated in the deliberative layer to be changed right way, 
eventhough the competition mechanism among emotions in the deliberative layer 
appear to be more “soft” and gradual.
The reason to choose “belief’ in the meta-management layer is that it possesses 
similar characteristics to the tertiary emotions, (i.e. the ability to hold some opinion 
for the long term, and the ability to resist it), Also, it more accurately describes the 
“coherence” process as the nature of UECHO determines (Wang 1998). Second, the 
formation of emotional beliefs as explained by (Frijda et al. 2000) in the literature
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review, provided the evidence needed to consider the addition of beliefs into the 
meta-management layer. It is important because the formed belief is useful in 
monitoring the agent’s decision making process, (i.e. to keep the selection process 
coherent with the history), therefore it seems logical to add this necessary component.
Designing the Meta-Management Layer
To be compatible and consistent with the deliberative layer, the design for 
meta-management layer is still under the connectionist network but with different 
settings and meanings behind it.
The first design issue is to choose an object for belief updating. That is, what 
might the agent care about all of the time? The best choice is to look at the evaluation 
of the opponent’s overall performance, as this exerts the greatest impact on people’s 
long term thinking. The three beliefs that the agent possesses in relation to the 
opponent while fighting are: skilful, comparable or inferior and we may use 
“Potent”,“Equivalent” or “Weak” to describe these beliefs.
The second issue surrounds how we choose the inputs for updating the agent’s 
belief. This is similar to the design in the deliberative layer, but events consisting of 
long term intervals are specified. They are “HScore”, “RScore”, “HEsc”, and 
“REsc”. These four events were chosen for inputs because they best represent the 
specified belief in the “human’s overall performance”. It is clear that the higher the 
score the better the win and the less escapes made, the better the performance can be
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rated.1 Other events such as “SS” and “SA” only represent the local performance for 
a player, (i.e. the performance during one battle), and they are not chosen as the inputs 
for long term belief updating.
We have learned from the literature review that the formation of a certain belief is 
also related to the formation of some dispositional emotion. We may hypothesize 
that a potential causal relationship existed between the elicitation of emotions and the 
formation of long term beliefs, (i.e. within a fixed event or object, similar emotional 
stimuli which is constantly elicited will eventually form a permanent belief). By 
mapping such a relationship into the connectionist network, we can conclude that 
there exists one more link between emotion and temporal belief. Such a setting that 
uses “sentiments” as an important influence on beliefs is also considered to be part of 
the “internal perception” process in the meta-management layer proposed by (Wright 
et al. 1996). For example, stimuli are not only externally perceived events but also 
present in the mind.
The third issue is how to connect emotional stimulus to beliefs. It is difficult to 
discern such a connection until we apply the concept of “concern” mentioned in the 
literature review. At this time, concern refers to some perception by the mind and not 
from external stimulus. To simplify and clarify, this assumes that a belief type is 
completely linked to only one certain concern which may be held by one or more 
emotions with different focuses.
1 Notice: one may argue people choose escape not only because of fear, but also 
because of other reasons such as lurk and sneak attack later or seeking rescue items 
for a better fight. It is still evident that someone, with the score of 5(people): O(agent) 
and no escape at all, has a better overall performance than someone with the same 
score but 10 more escapes.
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Figure 3.6: Network between Emotions, Concerns and Beliefs.
The above figure shows a rough implementation graph of Frijda’s conjecture
regarding the relationship between emotions, concerns and beliefs. The top row 
indicates three beliefs surrounding the opponent’s fighting performance. The middle 
row exhibits the three concerns to which beliefs are attached. The bottom row 
displays three emotions which may hold one or two concerns from the second row. 
The figure explains several possible cases in the meta-management layer: When the
agent believes its opponent to be strong, the agent feels oppressed causing the agent to 
act in two ways. One, it either chooses withdrawal because of fear or two, bursts out 
due to anger. In another case, if the agent believes it has the equivalent strength to the 
opponent, the pressure is not the same as when the opponent is perceived as strong. 
When the agent is mostly happy, it is cautious of fighting. On the other hand, if the 
agent perceives the opponent as weak, it will feel at an advantage and happiness will 
be increased. As the above design illustrates the definition given before of the three 
emotions, it is not surprising to see happiness play in two different situations as its 
nature of rational thinking determines.
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From the above illustration, we generated the connectionist network design for 
the meta-management layer as follows:
Potent Skill Weak SkillEquivalent Skill
HappinessFear Anger HScore RScore HEsc REsc
i  r
Special Evidence Unit
Input from the deliberative layer
Figure 3.7: The Connectionist Network o f  the Meta-Management Layer. The solid  
lines between each o f  the two boxes indicates a positive effect between them; while the 
dashed lines represent a negative effect between two emotions.
The above figure displays the structure of the belief network in the 
meta-management layer according to the description in the previous paragraphs. 
Notice that the layer of concerns is omitted and that the beliefs are directly linked to 
emotions. We have clearly seen the relationship between those two groups without 
the assistance of concerns. Aside from the emotions which help form beliefs with their 
activation values from the deliberative layer, four long term interval events are able to
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foster beliefs, too. The entire belief revision process mainly follows the revised 
coherence calculation (see page 54). The scaling parameters for those long term 
interval events used to create event intensity are displayed in the following table:
RScore HScore REsc HEsc
Potent Skill - , - 1 . 8 +,-1.8 [~0.\(tSScore>0) 
[0.1 (AScore<0)
- , - 1 . 8
Equivalent Skill - , - 1 . 8 f-0.1(ASbore>0) 
> . 1  (ASix>re<0)
+,-1.8 - , - 1 . 8
Weak Skill j-OA (AScore>Q) 
+’{o .l (AScore<0)
- , - 1 . 8 - , - 1 . 8 f-0.1(ASbore>0) 
jo .l (5Score<0)
Table 3.5 Scaling Parameters Table in the Meta-Management Layer 
The fourth issue is how to reflect on how the impact from the meta-management 
layer to the deliberative layer keeps the agent’s thoughts coherent with the past. As 
already mentioned in the literature review, and the early part of the previous section, 
such an impact can be exerted by the beliefs. Briefly speaking, one formed belief can 
elicit its own strength to influence the current emotional state by releasing the 
dispositional emotion, the sentiment. To map this point, the implementation of beliefs 
will be involved in the revised coherence calculations that happen in the deliberative
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layer. Something that needs to be stressed is that the emotional effects from beliefs are 
“dispositional”, meaning that the impacts under the current belief state should be 
constant in a certain period. The activation value of beliefs are not allowed to be 
updated during the revised coherence calculations until some long term event is 
perceived which signals the start of belief revision in the meta-management layer.
If we turn back to the figure 3.5, we can find the box labelled “long term effect” 
which was left unexplained. It actually denotes the impact from beliefs. When 
comparing figure 3.5 with figure 3.7, it is easy to tell that the box “long term effect” 
in figure 3.5 is composed of three smaller boxes each of which represents a belief 
candidate in figure 3.7. Since the meaning of the “long term effect” is clearly 
explained here, it is necessary to raise an example to illustrate how to keep the agent’s 
decision coherent to its beliefs. Suppose the current belief state is (0.1, 0.1, 0.8) in the 
order of “Potent, Equivalent, or Weak”, and the current emotional state is (0.6, 0.3, 
0.1) in the order of “Fear, Happiness, or Anger”: it is obvious that the current belief 
will relieve some fearful feelings in the agent after the revised coherence calculation 
in the deliberative layer is something like (0.41, 0.25, 0.44). This kind of emotional 
signal guides the agent to make some wiser decisions by synthesizing both the 
incidental effects and the long term effects. For example, the agent may choose 
“dodge&fight” instead of “forward&fight” suggested by the current belief state, or 
“escape” suggested by the current emotional state.
It is time to generalize the entire “coherence” working process designed between 
the deliberative layer and the meta-management layer. When the agent encounters a
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long term interval event, (HScore, RScore and so on), the whole emotional state is 
calculated in the deliberative layer by integrating the long term interval event. Next, it 
will send the produced emotional state with the event together to the 
meta-management layer where current beliefs will be updated according to the 
received emotional stimuli and event. Once the beliefs are updated, the 
meta-management layer will return the updated beliefs and the updated emotional 
state to the deliberative layer as the initial state of the next battle. So, when the agent 
encounters its enemy the next time, its emotional state in the deliberative layer will 
always be calculated by integrating the updated beliefs when the same events are 
perceived. Doing so makes the produced emotional state coherent to both the current 
situation and the past impression. When one long term interval event happens, the 
process will start again at the beginning as outlined in the beginning of this paragraph.
A Complete Working Flow in the Agent’s Mind Architecture
So far the complete introduction has been finished regarding the three layers agent 
architecture. We may have a look at the integrated map of it in order to form a full 
impression on it (See figure 11 below):
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Deliberative Layer
Stim ulj




(Long term effect from Meta-Management Layer)




Deliberative Layer Emotion Signal
Reactii e Layer
Action result to 
the outer world
Rule Based System
Figure 3.8: Complete A gent’s M ind Architecture. The three layers emotional agent 
architecture is clearly presented under my implementation.
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Experiment Design
Experiment Purposes
To validate the functionality of each layer of the agent’s mind architecture proposed 
previously, one experiment was set up with twenty human subjects. The experiment 
was set up for two purposes: one is to test if agents wired with emotion component(s) 
are able to behave much “better” than those without in some or all testing aspects. The 
word “better” here refers to the significant enhancement in certain experiment 
measure which can be computed under the statistic method ANOVA (Analysis of 
Variance) at the significant level of 0.05. In other words, the first purpose is to test if 
emotion is really helpful to enhance the agent’s performance. The second is to test if 
the three layers proposed in the last chapter are all necessary to enhance the agent’s 
performance. The above two hypotheses were tested by five experiment measures 
which will be mentioned soon.
For the first aim, it is simple to deal with, i.e. we can compare the performance 
between the full structure agent and the agent only with the reactive layer. However, 
to be compatible with the second aim, the first aim will be extended to make 
comparisons between the emotionless agent and three other types of “emotional” 
agents. If the performance from the experiment demonstrates one or more agents with 
emotion components behave better than the agents without, we can conclude the 
certain emotion architecture is useful. Otherwise we may say the testing emotional
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agent architecture is unable to embody its superiority over the regular rule based 
system. Notice “better” here will be measured in five different types of measures, 
which will be expounded in the next section.
The reason to create three types of emotion agents is for the second aim, i.e. to 
test if the full structure agent has the best performance over the emotional agents with 
only either part of the two upper layers. Again, if the full structured agent does not 
have better performance than the other emotional agents, we may conclude that some 
layer may be not necessarily added in, or some other factors could be analyzed that 
they hold back the good performance from the layer.
As a result, four types of agents are created: Reactive Agent (RA) which is 
emotionless due to only reactive layer wired, Emotion Only Agent (EOA) which is the 
agent with reactive layer and deliberative layer, i.e. the one can only be affected by 
incidental emotions, Belief Only Agent (BOA) which is equipped with reactive layer 
and meta-management layer, i.e. the one can only be affected by the expected 
emotions, and the Full Agent (FuA) which possesses all three layers introduced in the 
early of this chapter. Certainly, we expect FuA is able to bring outstanding 
performance over the other three types of agents.
Experiment Process Introduction
The general experiment process is as follows: Twenty subjects, ten dyads in total 
are invited. The experiment is formed of five sessions, in each of which two dyads 
among ten will be invited without duplication. One session consists of five phases,
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each of which is finely divided into two stages: challenging stage and rating stage in 
sequence. In each phase, each subject will be randomly assigned with an opponent, 
without knowing whom they will be played with beforehand; the opponent can be his 
or her partner in the same dyad or one of the four types of agents mentioned 
previously. The opponents’ appearing sequence for one subject will be created 
according to the Latin Square Order. The sample sequence order can be referred to 
Appendix B.
One challenging stage will last for 9 minutes in which the subject will fight his or 
her opponent in the uniform experiment map; the goal is simple: the subject is asked 
to seek the opponent and eliminate it when encountering it. Following the stage is the 
rating stage in which each subject will be asked to rate their score on five types of 
measures by filling out the question form within 3 minutes. The form contains 
questions or columns regarding the five measures which will be explained in the next 
section. The question form can be referred to the Appendix D. Since the challenging 
stage and the subsequent rating stage will be repeated five times to form a complete 
session, one session will last for exactly one hour.
All five sessions are all held in the same office room where four computers 
having the exactly same configuration are connected within the same local area 
network. They are placed in two rows of the tables onto each of which lines two 
computers; the monitors of the computers in different lines are positioned face to face. 
Each computer of the four is installed with the testing agents and the trial version of 
Quake2. The four participants will be asked to sit in front of the four computers
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respectively, and the two people in the same dyads are seated back to back, i.e. the 
computers they use are not in the same row; doing so can prevent people from 
recognizing his or her opponent as a human only because the subject discerns the 
actions from the screen can be mapped to the operations performed by the person 
sitting next to him or her. Rather, we expect subjects to judge their opponents’ 
performance by conceiving what they perceive from the game.
Each session there are six persons in locale: four subjects, one operator (the 
author) and one coordinator. The operator is responsible to claim start or end of a 
stage, and also for setting up the correct opponent for each subject in each challenging 
stage. The coordinator helps to collect marked question forms and replies necessary 
questions raised by subjects, such as how to customise personal controls before game 
starts. When in challenge stage, nobody will be allowed to talk with each other unless 
somebody decides to quit the experiment or the instructor claims the end of the stage. 
Marked question forms will be temporarily kept by the coordinator until the entire 
session is over; during one session, the instructor will not be allowed to know any 
information from the marked question form.
All the subjects in one session were paid 10 dollars after the session as described 
above was done. In the conducted experiment, they were all between the ages of 
twenty and twenty five and they were composed of four females and sixteen males. 
All five sessions were all composed of the subjects of the same gender, and all dyads 
were randomly paired within a session. No subject ceased his or her participation 
before the session ended. More details can be found in the Appendix C, the instruction
111
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
script.
Experiment Measures
To test all the designed agents’ performance in the game Quake2, five parameters 
have been chosen as measures, human believability, effectiveness and preference, 
long term effect and incidental effect. They were all collected from the question form: 
human believability, long term effect and incidental effect and preference map to the 
question 1 to 4 respectively and data for effectiveness is from the score table (See 
Appendix D for details). Among them, except the effectiveness, all the other four 
measures are subjective measures, i.e. they were obtained through subjects’ rating 
result. Effectiveness is objective measure and it was actually represented by the scores 
between the subject and his or her opponent in a battle.
Human believability here refers to the degree of what an agent behaves closely to 
a human. To test it, subjects will be asked to rate their last opponent in terms of its 
general performance. In other words, subjects will guess how possible their last 
opponent was actually acted by a human according to their impression. Their rating 
score should fall within the range 1 to 10. 1 means one subject fully believes his or 
her last opponent was a robot, while 10 means the subject fully believes the opponent 
was a human.
Preference refers to the degree of what an agent is favoured by a subject. 
Similarly to the Human believability, it will be obtained by asking subjects to score 
after one play; and the mark is also bounded between 1 and 10. 1 means the subject
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does not like the opponent at all, and 10 means he or she appreciates the opponent 
very much.
Effectiveness refers to the measure of one agent’s fighting performance. The data 
about it will be collected from the net income after one subject’s score subtracting his 
or her opponent’s score in one battle:
E f f { \  Subn) = S c r (A ,) -  Scr(Subn) (4.1)
In (4.1), ^.denotes agent i, and Subn denotes the n th subject, Scr is the 
abbreviation of “score”, and E ff for “effectiveness”.
To be directly related to the design of the agent architecture, two more auxiliary 
measures are chosen: long term effect and incidental effect.
Long term effect refers to one agent’s ability of keeping coherent to the past 
experience as human have. Since human are able to change their fighting attitudes 
according to their general fighting performance, such as human may behave more 
aggressive if they outperform their opponent much in the previous battles. The 
measure will be helpful to check if my designed meta-management layer could have 
some equivalent performance as human does. To test it, subjects will be asked to 
measure the coherent degree of changes in their last opponent’s behaviours or 
strategies within the entire nine minutes’ challenging stage. 1 means the subject does 
not observe any coherent change from their opponent in a challenging stage, 10 means 
the subject thinks what the opponent behaved is perfectly coherent to what an average 
person could do in a challenging stage.
Incidental effect refers to one agent’s ability of making human-like adaptation
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during a short term, say in a battle encounter. Since human are able to adjust their 
fighting skill according to the stimuli they receive in a battle, the measure will be 
helpful to check if the designed deliberative layer could have some equivalent 
adaptation as human does. Similarly to the above measure, 1 means the subject does 
not observe any human-like adaptation made by their opponent in battles, 10 means 
the subject thinks opponent’s adaptability in fight is totally like what a human does in 
fight.
Since the other measures except effectiveness are all subjective ones, the data 
collected about them should be converted to the values relative to the human 
opponent’s corresponding scores before performing statistical process1. The main 
reason to do so is it is to normalize the scores to a subject’s “base-line” of what they 
consider human. Therefore, we need to convert different ratings into the relative score 
before doing any statistics. One participant’s relative feed back to a certain type of 
agent can be computed as follows:
F b ( \  M J) = Rt ( An M j )  (4.2)
In the above formula, Fb(Al M .)means one subject’s final feedback to the agent 
Al.about the measure M . is the difference between his or her rating to the agent 
Rt(Ai , M j)  and his or her human opponentR t(H , Mj.) in the same measure..
After the above conversion, the data for five types of measures will be processed 
by single Repeated Measures ANOVA (Analysis of Variance).
1 It is originally suggested by my supervisor Dr. Joesoph Maclnnes.
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Summary of Methodology
In this chapter, the methodology was introduced on how to design an emotional agent 
by using Sloman’s three layers mind architecture, and it was followed by the 
validation component, the experiment design.
Regarding the agent design, we started with a discussion on the deficiency a rule 
based system has, i.e. rigid and reflexive only mechanism, which is incapable of 
reacting in diverse ways as human does. Then, a potential solution towards the 
problem is proposed, adoption of the emotion theory to the rule based system. The 
main framework of the agent architecture is based on the Sloman’s Three Layers 
conjecture about human’s mind, but with simplification and improvement tailored to 
the game Quake2. Two highlights can be identified with the design: one is adding the 
self-adaptation mechanism to emotion system which follows Damasio’s Somatic 
Markers Hypothesis but with more specification: each emotion may have its own 
feature to mark objects or events, instead of simply grouping the emotional effects by 
positive or negative ones. Such adaptation mechanism also demonstrates that the 
emotional decision should not be made only according to its current emotional state, 
but also based on the action readiness in an object or event. The combination of 
considering the above two factors could generate more smooth and more realistic 
decisions as human does. The other highlight is to make use of beliefs in the 
meta-management layer, as it is expected to guide agent to make decision not only in 
terms of the current generated emotional signals, but also taking the account of past 
experience or impression.
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Regarding validation on the agent architecture, the experiment design, has been 
presented with detailed expound. The experiment will be used to mainly testify two 
hypotheses under the proposed agent architecture: one is the emotional agent should 
behave more human-like than the emotionless agent; second, the agent with the full of 
proposed agent architecture should outperform any other types of agents with only 
part of emotional architecture. In other words, if both hypotheses can be proved true, 
the agent architecture is definitely meaningful to the future emotional agent design. To 
make the two hypotheses measurable, five types of parameters were picked up as 
measures for all types of testing agents: believability, effectiveness, preference, long 
term effect and incidental effect. The method of how to measure them is presented 
later with explanation. Finally, a sufficiently described experiment process was given.
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Results and Analysis
This chapter will present the experiment result with explanation. It is followed by the 
conclusions regarding the validation result of the proposed agent architecture.
After running the experiment and collecting the data for those five measures 
introduced in the “experiment design” of the last chapter, we will first test if there is 
any correlation between the four measures; if any correlation is found, we may infer 
the experiment result may not be objective as it may be influenced by the correlation 
to some extent. And then we will make Repeated Measures ANOVA on those 
experiment measures in order to see any significant difference among them. If some 
significant difference in a measure is observed, the further pair wise comparisons 
among those five types of opponents will be adopted by using Turkey’s HSD 
(Honestly Significance Difference) algorithms.
Correlation Analysis
The correlations between each pair of the five measures have been examined by 
running SPSS as the following table shows:
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Beli Prf LTE STE
Beli Pearson Correlation 1 .544 .439 .484
Prf Pearson Correlation .544 1 .411 .638
LTE Pearson Correlation .439 .411 1 .496
STE Pearson Correlation .484 .638 .496 1
Table 4.1: Correlations between Each Pair o f  the Five Measures. A bold figure in the 
table denotes a significant correlation between the measure o f  the row and the one o f  
the column a t the level o f 0.01 (Beli: Believability, Prf: Preference, LTE: Long Term 
Effect, STE: Short Term Effect).
Since the significant correlations have been found between each pair of those four 
subjective measures, it indicates each measure was probably influenced by the other 
three measures. For example, the highest correlation 0.638 between STE and Prf 
implies that subjects preferred the agents with good fighting skills most, but they paid 
less concerns on the agent’s long term behaviours and strategies (0.411 between LTE 
and Prf). Besides, we also find that the correlation between Believability and 
Preference is 0.544, the second highest one among the six correlation values. This 
implies that to some certain extent subjects who liked playing with some opponent 
tended to rate a high score for their opponent’s Believability, and vice versa. The final 
finding is that the correlation between STE and LTE is 0.496, which implies the 
subjects may rate STE and LTE in the same trend, i.e. either high marks in or low 
marks in the two measures.
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Statistics Results for Believability
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Figure 4.1 : Standard M eans fo r  Five Types o f  Agents on Believability
From the above figure, it is manifest to see the FuA has the highest mean value in 
believability over the other four including human opponent. The result seems 
surprising as FuA even surpasses the humans in believability although the former is 
not significantly better than the latter (see table 4.3 below). It is rational to see this 
result; it is not only because relative complete emotion dealing mechanism is wired in
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FuA, but also because not all human participants were proficient in game playing and 
judgement; some inexperience subjects may behave poorer than FuA or make wrong 
judgement on their opponent’s overall performance.
By running SPSS to perform the Repeated Measures of ANOVA with the 
confidence interval of 0.05, we could obtain the following statistic result which 
extracted from the raw tables generated by SPSS:
The variable Believability is significant as /(4 ,76 ) = 5.13, p  < 0.001.
Therefore, we may further figure out which pair or pairs of objects have such 
difference by using Turkey’s HSD as table 4.2 shows:
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Pairwise Comparisons by HSD
Measure: Believability (“Beli” in the following table)





















Table 4.2: Pairwise Comparisons fo r  Believability by HSD.
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Table 4.2 indicates that FuA and Human opponents both have the significantly 
better performance in Believability than RA. The finding suggests the emotional agent, 
at least FuA, is able to enhance the believability for game agents.
Statistics Results for Effectiveness
Again, similarly to the above procedures, the standard means of the five types of 













RA H umDOA BOAFuA
Figure 4.2 : Standard M eans fo r  Five Types o f  Agents on Effectiveness
From the above graph, we can find FuA did not behave ideally; it only had
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significantly better performance than RA. It is intuitive to see EOA has the highest 
standard mean on this category.
Again, by running SPSS in repeated measures ANOVA, we can obtain the result 
that the variable effectiveness is significant as /(3 .05 ,57.89) = 3.55, p  < 0.02.
Therefore, we may further figure out which pair or pairs of objects have such 
difference as table 4.3 shows:
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Pairwise Comparisons by HSD
Measure: Effectiveness (“Eff” in the following table)





















Table 4.3: Pairwise Comparisons fo r  Effectiveness by HSD.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 4.3 concludes that only EOAhave significantly better fighting performance than 
RA, and no significant difference among others, although we can discover that FuA 
has “almost significant” better performance than RA. The finding illustrates some 
type of emotional agent, at least EOA, can help improve game agent’s fighting 
performance.
Statistics Results for Preference
Again, similarly to the above procedures, the standard means of the five types of 








RA H u mEOA BOAFuA
Figure 4.3 :Standard Means fo r  Five Types o f  Agents on Preference
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From the above graph, we can find FuA won the favour from subjects as it has 
the highest standard mean on this category. BOA is also outstanding but less fancied 
by subjects than FuA.
Again, by running SPSS in repeated measures ANOVA, we can obtain the result 
that the variable Preference is significant as /(4 ,76 ) = 5.17, p  < 0.001.
Therefore, we may further figure out which pair or pairs of objects have such 
difference as table 4.4 shows:
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Pairwise Comparisons by HSD
Measure: Preference (“Pref” in the following table)





















Table 4.4: Pairwise Comparisons fo r  Preference by HSD.
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In table 4.4, the analysis of preference implies that FuA has significantly better 
performance than EOA and RA, and human opponents performed significantly better 
than EOA and RA. The finding from table 4.4 suggests FuA is mostly favoured by 
human subjects as it possesses the emotional architecture while the RA does not, and 
FuA also wins more favour than EOA and BOA, especially much more than EOA. By 
comparing the difference among the three types of agents’ architectures, and also 
some evidence from correlations discussed before (since the STE and LTE are both 
positively correlated to Preference), it could infer that the combination of the two 
types of emotions within an agent’s architecture is necessary to enhance the agent’s 
performance, at least for the increase of human players’ favourite degree to the game 
agent.
Statistics Results for Long Term Effect
The standard means of the five types of opponents (including human) for Long 
Term Effect are:
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Figure 4.4: Standard M eans fo r  Five Types o f  Agents on Long Term Effect
From the above graph, we can find FuA and BOA are both outstanding on this 
category.
Again, by running SPSS in repeated measures ANOVA, we can obtain the result 
that the variable Long Term Effect is significant as /(4 ,76 ) = 8.45, p  < 0.001
Therefore, we may further figure out which pair or pairs of objects have such 
difference as table 4.5 shows:
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Pairwise Comparisons by HSD
Measure: Long Term Effect (“LTE” in the following table)





















Table 4.5: Pairwise Comparisons fo r  Long Term Effect by HSD.
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Table 4.5 suggests that FuA evidently has more consistent performance than EOA 
and RA as the former is equipped with the third layer where long term belief updating 
system resides in. Human opponents are certainly significantly better than EOA and 
RA, too.
Since FuA has satisfactory performance on the Long Term Effect, we may 
attribute the result to their possession of belief component. It further demonstrates 
Belief component is helpful to enhance the agent’s coherence in the long term run.
Statistics Results for Incidental Effect















Figure 4.5 -.Standard Means fo r  Five Types o f  Agents on Incidental Effect
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From the above graph, we can find FuA is outstanding on this category. It also 
has the slightly higher means than Human.
Again, by running SPSS in repeated measures ANOVA, we can obtain the result 
that the variable Incidental Effect is significant as / ( 3 .10,58.87) = 4.87, p  < 0.004 
Therefore, we may further figure out which pair or pairs of objects have such 
difference as table 4.6 shows:
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Pairwise Comparisons by HSD
Measure: Incidental Effect (“IE” in the following table)





















Table 4.6: Pairwise Comparisons fo r  Incidental Effect by HSD.
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Table 4.6 only suggests FuA and Human have the significantly better 
performance in Incidental Effect than RA.
Statistics on the Overall Believability of the 
Agents
By synthesizing the above four measures, we may further figure out their overall 
performance based on those measures in order to obtain a rough rank order for them. 
The procedure is to work out the averages of the four measures rated by each subject, 







Figure 4 .6 :Standard M eans fo r  Five Types o f  Agents on Overall Believability
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From the above graph, we can find FuA is outstanding on this category. It also 
has the slightly higher means than Human.
Again, by running SPSS in repeated measures ANOVA, we can obtain the result 
that the Overall Believability is significant as / ( 4 ,76) = 9.515, p  < 0.001
Therefore, we may further figure out which pair or pairs of objects have such a 
significant difference as table 4.7 shows:
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Pairwise Comparisons by HSD
Measure: Incidental Effect (“OB” in the following table)





















Table 4.7: Pairwise Comparisons fo r  Incidental Effect by HSD.
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From the overall performance, we may discover that FuA and Human both behaved 
significantly better than RA. It further confirms the hypothesis one in overall that 
emotion with appropriate agent architecture is able to perform much better than 
emotionless ones.
Conclusions on the Experiment Result
By synthesizing the conclusions from the above five measures by HSD, we can 
produce the following table which reflects each types of opponent’s performance 


























Human RA EOA, RA EOA,
RA
RA RA
Table 4.8: Synthesis o f  the Statistic Result
From the above table, it is intuitive to see FuA possesses sufficiently good 
performance in the experiment as it almost behaved the same as what human 
participants did. On one hand, it is worth noting because it demonstrates most of the
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hypothesis one proposed in the third chapter:
One is emotional components are basically necessary to enhance the agents’ 
playing performance in games. As HSD suggests, FuA, which is fully equipped with 
emotion components, have remarkably high ratings than the emotionless agent (RA) 
in four of the five measures. EOA and BOA, the agents wired with only part of 
emotional components, show fewer positive results than FuA did, i.e., EOA only 
behaved significantly better than RA in Effectiveness and BOA in Long Term Effect. 
But EOA and BOA at least reflects their certain enhancement in agent’s playing 
performance by adding emotions. According to the above facts, it is rational to 
conclude that only the combination of the two types of emotional components is able 
to bring the most satisfactory enhancement in agent’s overall performance.
Another is table 4.8 testifies the issue of the emotional agent architecture design. 
As HSD suggests, FuA outperforms EOA in Long Term Effect and Preference. The 
finding demonstrates the necessity to take into account the functionality of long term 
effect when modelling emotions; FuA has the same settings as EOA has but possesses 
one more layer, the meta-management layer, which would be considered the main 
reason why FuA performs much better than EOA in the Long Term Effect. 
Furthermore, the fact that FuA is remarkably favoured by most of subjects over EOA 
also suggests human players prefer the setting of the long term emotions. On the other 
side, the finding that the BOA alone was unable to embody its superiority over EOA 
in Long Term Effect again implies the necessity of using the combination of the two 
different types of emotions.
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On the other hand, hypothesis two is failed to be demonstrated.
We can discover that FuA did not show any significantly better than EOA or BOA, 
and the above is what hypothesis two is designed to test. By comparing the structures 
between FuA and EOA and between FuA and BOA, we may infer that the interaction 
between the meta-management layer and the deliberative layer holds back the 
performance of FuA in Effectiveness.
The explanation to the above deficiency and possible solutions will be discussed 
on the sub section “Possible Amelioration for Testifying Unproved Hypothesis” under 
the next chapter “Conclusion and Future Work”.
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Contributions and Future Work 
Contributions
This thesis partially tested the two hypotheses proposed in the abstract section and 
thus the following contributions can be taken into account:
First, emotion theory can be considered useful in enhancing the playing 
performance for agents in computer games. As was stated in the first hypothesis, 
FuA possesses significantly better performance than emotionless agent RA in most of 
the five measures. Other emotional agents also behaved much better than RA in some 
measures.
Second, the rationality of the proposed agent architecture (FuA) is supported by 
the evidence collected in the end of the preceding chapter. That is to say, Long term 
emotions are necessary in the emotional agent design, and only the combination of the 
two types of emotions can obtain the most satisfactory enhancement for agent’s 
gaming performance. As a result, this thesis suggests that when building emotional 
agents, the belief system is an essential addition to the emotional agent architecture 
since emotions released from beliefs are able to make agents’ decisions coherent to 
their past experience.
Third, the thesis develops a simple but feasible interaction mechanism between 
two types of emotions (see the section related to the design of the meta-management 
layer), which once received little interest in emotion research or only theoretic 
frameworks were presented (Damasio 1994, Loewenstein and Lerner 2003, Wright
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et al. 1996). The lack of consideration and implementation of the higher emotions’ 
working mechanism may be used to explain why some researchers claimed they could 
only create more diverse but still less human-like emotional decisions (Henninger et 
al. 2003).
Last, this thesis made an innovative attempt to understand the adaptability of 
emotions as outlined in Damasio’s Somatic Markers Hypothesis (Damasio 1994) and 
Frijda’s motivation theory (Frijda 2004). The proposed emotional updating 
mechanism is easily adoptable. It is also distinct from other classical artificial 
intelligence learning algorithms, (reinforcement learning for example), as it is based 
on experiment findings in neuroscience and thus more closely emulates the human 
thinking process.
Future Work
The current emotion modelling work is still far from complete. Many aspects must 
still be improved in the future in order to create more believable agents and more 
objective experimental results. The rest of this section will outline a possible solution 
to the unproved hypothesis, and then propose future improvements for either the 
agent’s architecture or the experiment design.
Possible Amelioration for Testifying Unproved Hypothesis 
in Future
As mentioned in the last chapter about the conclusions from the experiment, FuA
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did not outperform BOA and EOA in a significant way on some certain measures as 
was expected by hypothesis two (See “experiment purpose” under the chapter 
“Methodology”). By examining the structures between FuA and BOA or EOA, it is 
easy to tell FuA possesses one more different layer than BOA or EOA, the 
deliberative layer or the meta-management layer, respectively. The rest of FuA is the 
same as BOA. Therefore, it is easy to assume that some deficiency in the interaction 
mechanism between the deliberative layer and the meta-management layer held back 
the FuA making significantly better performance than them.
This problem or deficiency may be due to the fact that some settings in the agent 
architecture may overly emphasize long term effects but overlook incidental effects. 
By recalling the introduced interaction procedure between the deliberative layer and 
the meta-management layer (see page 104 to 105), the long term effect exerts its own 
influence on the emotional state in the deliberative layer so as to keep the produced 
emotional signal being coherent to the past experience. Since a belief can always 
strengthen its linked emotions, and it is not weakened by other units within the 
deliberative layer (see page 85), its influence may be sometimes overly powerful 
compared to other regular units. This prevents the agent from taking any other 
contradictive information into account. For example, an agent holding the strong 
belief that its opponent is weak may always select fighting aggressively without 
considering the successions of negative evidence such as FA and FS. From this point 
we can find the emotional signals produced by FuA are close to the ones by BOA 
because the incidental effect in FuA is sometimes too feeble and unconcerned during
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the revised coherence calculation. Thus, the two types of agents may produce a 
similar decision if given the same situations.
There are a number of approaches possible in order to solve this problem. The 
most direct one is to allow the beliefs to be updated in the deliberative layer. The 
difficulty is that this violates the hypothesis from Frijda (2004) which states that 
belief is a kind of dispositional emotion so that it should exert the stable emotional 
influence. Another approach is to modify the linking weights between emotions and 
beliefs to be weaker in the deliberative layer so that beliefs cannot exert their 
influences as greatly as before. Yet, such an approach holds the risk of insufficient 
consideration for the long term effect.
The feasible approach is to build up a mechanism which could rationally involve 
the long term effect only when it is necessary. That is to say, the involvement of the 
long term effect may not always be required by the deliberative layer. Rather, in some 
urgent situation or certain tertiary emotional states (grief for example), the 
meta-management layer may also possibly lose its control over its bottom layer 
(Wright et al. 1996). Thus, any future work could focus on how to build up a kind of 
urgency mechanism in order to involve the long term effect in a selective way. For 
example, the mechanism may specify that if a certain urgent level is reached, the 
agent should give up considering the long term effect. This kind of consideration also 
parallels the claims found in most works of emotion scholars who agree that making 
quick decisions to deal with urgent situations required less deliberation (LeDoux 
1996, Yentura 2000, Sloman 2001). The above possible solution also
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Possible Improvements on the Agent Architecture
Although the agent architecture provides a basic framework to model human 
emotions, there is still a lot of room for improvement in each of the three layers.
First, all the symbols defined in the reactive layer, including the symbols within 
the fighting theme, should be given emotion adaptability. Doing so would make the 
agent more adaptable to any other domain dependent environments where it has little 
emotional experience.
Second, other intelligence components need to be added in the deliberative layer. 
As Damasio described in the first chapter, the emotion itself can not substitute the 
position of intelligence. If we want to gain high believability for agents, we still need 
to empower it with the ability to perform reasoning, planning or other intelligent 
activities similar to humans.
Third, it is necessary to extend the ability of the meta-management layer, (i.e. we 
could add more global control mechanisms over the entire agent architecture). In 
addition to the urgency mechanism mentioned in the previous section, the issue of 
how improve control or evaluation on the higher deliberation process, (as suggested 
by (Wright et al. 1996, Sloman 2001)), may also pose as a challenging topic for 
future implementation on the meta-management layer.
Possible Improvements on the Experiment Design
In this section, a few of experiment design deficiencies are identified below with 
possible solutions for future ameliorations:
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First, we may do some improvement to better test those two hypotheses in future. 
For the hypothesis one, we can put much more focus on “measuring enhancement” 
from the emotional agents to emotionless agents instead of sheer comparisons 
between them. That is to say, in the future experiment, we can further figure out what 
and how much actually benefit we could gain if we add some emotional component to 
an emotionless agent; for example, if we find FuA is able to improve the agent’s 
believability, we may further ask how much it is able to improve for emotionless 
agents. For hypothesis two, we should waive some unnecessary comparisons. In other 
words, if some emotional agent cannot embody their advantage over emotionless in 
some experiment measure, it seems not necessary to make further comparisons 
between this type of emotional agents with the others. For example in the current 
experiment, it seems EOA is unable to improve the agent’s believability, the 
comparison between FuA and EOA in believability is therefore not necessary.
Second, since it has been found high correlations between those four subjective 
measures, it may not be sufficient to use only one single question to measure each of 
them (see Appendix D). A single question may not cover all the important aspects of a 
measure. For example, during the rating stage of the experiment, some subjects raised 
questions about the difference of STE and LTE, which implies they did not understand 
those two measures very well or they could not tell any dissimilarity between them. 
As a result, more questions need to be designed for each of those measures. Since 
those questions are able to better embody the characteristics of a single measure, they 
are believed to reduce the correlations between measures and present more
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convincing experimental results.
There are some other reasons to explain the high correlations between the four 
subjective measures. One is some questions in Appendix D were not well written so 
that some subjects did not understand the purpose of setting the question. The other is 
subjects did have their own biases on ratings. From the correlation result table 4.1, we 
can find people tended to rate high scores on both Preference and STE simultaneously. 
For the first reason, more clear statement in questions of the Appendix B needs to be 
made in future. For the second reason, the next point of improvement which suggests 
recruiting more people seems necessary to reduce the biases produced by individuals.
Third, the quantity of experiment subjects may not embody the diversity for the 
experiment, i.e. twenty subjects may not be sufficiently to represent most of the 
people’s opinions on my designed agent. Therefore, recruiting more people for the 
future experiment is necessary.
A fourth improvement would be to categorize the subjects according to their level 
of playing skill before the experiment. As mentioned before, some subjects were 
unskilled at Quake2 and so their behaviours were judged as non-human, along with 
the robot. Thus, it was difficult to distinguish between the behaviours performed by 
humans from robots. This point is also the reason why even human themselves 
cannot embody some superior characteristics in long term effects and incidental 
effects over FuA and BOA. Their opinions should be rectified by recruiting the same 
percentage of subjects who are in the advanced level of playing skills.
One criterion for such a categorization might be to check if playing scores have
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reached some specified mark before the experiment begins. Those players scoring 
above the mark could be grouped as advanced players, and the others could be 
grouped as basic players. More refined categorizations according to score levels are 
also possible, i.e. high, medium and low. This kind of categorization would be 
expected to result in more objective ratings of the five measures used in the 
experiment.
A fifth improvement would be to better balance certain experiment criteria within 
given conditions and increase the experimental conditions tested. In the current 
experiment settings, there was a gender imbalance among invitees in either the entire 
experiment or between groups, (i.e. only four participants were females compared to 
the sixteen male participants for the experiment, and only one group of female 
subjects compared to the other four groups of male subjects). Nor were there any 
groups that consisted of an equal number of mixed genders, (i.e. two male subjects 
against two female subjects in a session). Reasonably, it is necessary to test the equal 
number of the three types of groups, (i.e. the groups of all males, the groups of all 
females and the groups of the mixture of the equal number of males and females). 
Doing this would collect rating results for the agents from a more generalized testing 
condition.
Next, the statistics methods applied should allow for between-subjects factors 
such as “gender”, “skill level”, “male group”, “female group” and “mixture group”.
Last, in order to stand out the LTE from STE, we may consider extending the 
duration of an experimental session to be longer, say 1 hour and 15 minutes, As the
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LTE is a kind of less observable effect and it may require more time to be aware 
the subjects.
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Appendix
Appendix A (Typical Game Scenario)
A common fighting picture from the game Quake2 can be found in Appendix A.
Figure A l:  A  Common Fighting Scenario in Quake2
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Appendix B (Sample Appearance Order)
Sample Appearance Order in One Session according to the Latin Square order:
No.15: Hum FuA RA BOA EOA
No.16: RA FuA Hum EOA BOA
No.17: BOA EOA Hum RA FuA
No. 18: Hum EOA RA FuA BOA
Four computers in the experiment room are named No. 15, No. 16, No. 17 and No. 18 
according to the last two digits of their IPs in the local area network.
From the above displayed order, we may find the subjects in No. 15 and No. 18 belong 
to the same dyad as they are arranged to fight in the first phase, and No. 16 and No. 17 
belong to another.
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Appendix C (Instruction Script)
Introduction to Participants
Welcome to the exciting Quake2 game world. In the forthcoming experiment, you 
will be asked to play with each of five different types of opponents first for 9 minutes; 
your opponents could be either human players or computer robots. After you finish 
one play, you will be asked to rate the subsequent three questions (see the answer 
form in your hand) in 3 minutes, by recalling your memory of the last play. The above 
process, i.e. playing with one opponent (called “Fighting stage”) and then rating the 
questions (“Rating stage”), will loop for five times until all of your opponents have 
played once with you. For this game, your only task is to earn as many points as you 
can. The rule is simple: When you eliminate your opponent once, you will be awarded 
1 point. While you are killed once, you will lose 1 point (The score board can be 
triggered by pressing FI on your keyboard or you can watch it on the top left comer 
of the screen during game playing). The entire experiment is estimated to take up your 
following 60 minutes.
Instruction Script
1. Please read the above introduction part if you feel interest to this experiment 
design. Also, please make sure you agree the content in the consent form, and sign 
it before you start playing.
2. [After each subject signs on the consent form, speak to all subjects:] Please turn
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away from your facing monitor until the experiment instructor (El) tells you to 
turn back; El will connect your opponent to you during this period. Please do 
NOT turn back until you are told to do so. Thanks for your cooperation.
3. [Start typing the name of one agent or connect to another player’s server for each 
subject, (Note: the appearance order of the opponents is different for every player, 
but it sticks to the Latin Square Algorithm). And then speak to all of the subjects:] 
you can turn back now. Let us start the fighting stage. Please wear your ear phone 
and keep silent during the game playing. [After all subjects wear their earphones, 
speak to all subjects:] Please start your game by pressing “Enter” in your 
keyboard.
4. [After 10 minutes playing, speak to all subjects:] The fighting stage ends. Please 
take off your earphone and start rating the questions in your form. You have 3 
minutes to copy your current scores V.S. your opponents to your form, and please 
also mark the three questions for the last opponent below the score table; you can 
also make use of the rest of time for break. [After three minutes, speak to all 
subjects if this is not the last time to play with opponents:] Please turn yourself 
from your facing monitor; the El will connect your opponent to you during this 
period. Please do NOT turn back until you are told to do so. Thanks for your 
cooperation.
5. Repeat the step 3 and 4 in the same order for five times in total.
6. (Speak to all subjects :) Time is up. Please hand in your question form. Thanks a 
lot for your cooperation.
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You V S . OpponentX: :
Please circle an appropriate number which is the best fit your thought for the question. 
You are NOT allowed to modify your previous rating result(s) when you are working 
on your current rating process, e.g. you are NOT allowed to modify your rating result 
for opponent 1 to 4 when you are working on rating the opponent 5.
1. Do you think your opponent was a human (1 means it’s certain a computer agent, 
10 means it is certain a human)?
OpponentX: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
2. What do you think your opponent’s long term behaviour? Is it close to what an 
average person does? For example, you may expect him or her to behave more 
aggressively (e.g. more likely to attack you) or more conservatively (e.g. more 
likely to flee from you) after many battles, but what did your opponent actually do 
from your expectation? Please circle a number from the following ten figures to 
indicate the close degree your opponent to a human according to his or her long 
term behaviours (1 indicates you did not notice any long term behaviour 
performed by your opponent, 10 indicates you believe what your opponent 
behaved is what an average person does in the long run).
Opponent X: 1 2 3 4 5  6 7  8 9  10
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3. During a fight encounter, what do you think of your opponent’s performance? Is it 
close to what an average person performs? Please circle a score from the 
following ten figures to indicate the close degree your opponent to a human 
according to his or her fight performance (1 indicates you do not think the 
opponent expressed any human-like behaviour in fight, 10 indicates you believe 
for sure that your opponent’s fight performance is totally like what a human could 
do).
OpponentX: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
4. Rate your current opponent to indicate your favourite degree: (1 is you did not like 
to play with the opponent at all, 10 means you like playing with the opponent the 
most).
OpponentX: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
(Note: “X” appeared in the above can be substituted by the number 1 to 5. Since the 
question form for one subject has five copies, each of which will ask the subject to 
rate on only one type of opponent. Doing so is to prevent the subject from revising the 
previous rating result when working on the current one.)
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